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I. THE WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER     
PROTECTION ACT OF 2010 
On December 11, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009.1  On May 20,
2010, the U.S. Senate passed the Restoring American Financial Stability
Act of 2010.2  At the time this Article was written, the Senate and the
House were still to meet in a conference committee to reconcile the 
differences between the two reform bills.  The two policy proposals of
particular concern here are (1) section 103 of the Investor Protection 
Act, as set forth in House Bill 3817,3 and (2) proposed legislative
language by the Obama administration to implement the so-called 
Volcker Rule.4 
A.  Section 103 of the Investor Protection Act 
On June 17, 2009, the Obama administration introduced its white 
paper Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: Rebuilding 
Financial Supervision and Regulation (Treasury White Paper), proposing
significant and comprehensive regulatory reform in response to what it 
identified as the “most severe financial crisis since the Great
Depression.”5  The Treasury White Paper offered specific recommendations 
1. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th 
Cong. (2010) (enacted). 
2. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (enacted).
3. Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. § 103 (2010). 
4. See Phil Mattingly & Rebecca Christie, Obama Sends ‘Volcker Rule’ Proposal 
on Bank Trading to Congress, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 3, 2010, 20:17 EST), http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ahiprjVlhV5w&pos=9.  The proposed 
legislative text addressing the Volcker Rule can be found at Amendment to the Bank 
Holding Company Act Regarding the Size of Institutions and the Scope of Bank Activities,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
amend.final.-3-3-10.pdf [hereinafter Volcker Rule].
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 2 (2009) [hereinafter
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intended to address five key goals: (1) promote robust supervision and
regulation of financial firms, (2) establish comprehensive supervision
and regulation of financial markets, (3) protect consumers and investors 
from financial abuse, (4) improve tools for managing financial crises, 
and (5) raise international regulatory standards and improve international 
cooperation.6  With respect to this third goal, measures aimed at
strengthening the existing framework for investor protection by
concentrating on principles of fairness were set forth; specifically, the 
Obama administration would insist that broker-dealers, who provide
investment advice regarding securities to retail investors, have the same 
fiduciary duties and obligations as registered investment advisers, in this
way harmonizing the legal framework applicable to what are perceived
as “virtually identical” financial actors.7 
Six months after issuing this proposal, Congress proposed section 103 
of the Investor Protection Act,8 titled “Establishment of a Fiduciary Duty
for this Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers, and Harmonization of 
Regulation,” which would amend section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act)9 by adding a new subsection, (k), styled “Standard 
of Conduct,” providing that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) 
shall promulgate rules to provide that, with respect to a broker or dealer, when
providing personalized investment advice about securities to a retail customer10 
(and such other customers as the [SEC] may by rule provide),11 the standard of
conduct for such broker or dealer with respect to such customer shall be the 
same as the standard of conduct applicable to an investment adviser under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.12 
TREASURY WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/
FinalReport_web.pdf. 
 6. Id. at 2–4. 
7. See id. at 71. 
8. H.R. 3817 § 103. 
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a –78oo (2006)). 
10. For the purposes of section 103 of the Investor Protection Act, Congress proposed 
defining the term retail customer to mean “a natural person or the legal representative of 
such natural person, who (A) receives personalized investment advice about securities from a
broker or dealer; and (B) uses such advice primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes.”  H.R. 3817 § 103(a)(1)(B). 
11. The Investor Protection Act thus goes further than the Treasury White Paper
insofar as it states that the SEC shall have authority to regulate a fiduciary duty standard 
owing to customers other than just retail customers.  See id.; see also TREASURY WHITE
PAPER, supra note 5, at 63. 
12. H.R. 3817 § 103(a)(1)(B).  The final Senate bill abandoned this rulemaking and
instead took the more conservative approach of recommending additional studies into whether 
the House proposal was feasible.  Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010,
S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 913 (2010).  The present Article can be viewed as a small part of
such future study.
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Section 103 of the Investor Protection Act would similarly amend
section 211 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act)13 by
adding a new subsection, (f), also styled “Standard of Conduct,” providing
as follows: 
 The Commission shall promulgate rules to provide that the standard of
conduct for all brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, when providing
personalized investment advice about securities to retail customer (and such 
other customers as the Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act
[solely]14 in the best interest of the customer without regard to the financial or
other interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.15 
The Investor Protection Act, however, takes a further step, not
contemplated by the Treasury White Paper, in proposing to endow the 
SEC with authority to regulate not just disclosures of securities products 
sold by broker-dealers and investment advisers but also the “merits” of
the underlying transaction as well and the merits of the sales practices 
and compensation structures associated therein.  In particular, section
103 would amend section 15 of the Exchange Act by adding new
subsection (l) and section 211 of the Advisers Act by adding new 
subsection (g), both styled “Other Matters,” providing as follows: 
    The Commission shall: (1) facilitate the provision of simple and clear disclosures 
to investors regarding the terms of their relationships with brokers, dealers,
and investment advisers, including any material conflicts of interest; and
(2) examine and, where appropriate, promulgate rules prohibiting or restricting
certain sales practices, conflicts of interest, and compensation schemes for brokers,
dealers, and investment advisers that the Commission deems contrary to the
public interest and the protection of investors.16 
1.  The Applicable Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers and 
Investment Advisers Will Likely Be the Same 
Because broker-dealers have generally not been held to a fiduciary
standard, and because most causes of action brought by investors against
broker-dealers claiming a violation of the fiduciary duty owed to them
13. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1, -21 (2006)). 
14. Certain draft language put forth by the Obama administration contains a stricter
“sole interest” test.  Title IX—Additional Improvements to Financial Markets Regulation  
§ 913, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (July 10, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Documents/tg205071009.pdf. 
15. H.R. 3817 § 103(a)(2) (2010). 
16. Id. § 103(a)(1)–(2). 
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have been arbitrated—and therefore are not published—there exists 
minimal guidance as to what this fiduciary duty for broker-dealers might 
look like in practice.17  Although some advocates of financial reform 
have suggested creating a new fiduciary standard that would apply with
equal force to broker-dealers and investment advisers alike,18 statements 
made by various SEC commissioners and other commentators suggest 
that regulators will simply include broker-dealers within the Advisers 
Act by effectively repealing the current provision of the Act expressly
excluding broker-dealers from its regulatory span.19  This interpretation 
would be consistent with language in the Treasury White Paper contending 
that the standard of care applicable to broker-dealers should be raised to 
a fiduciary duty standard in order to “align the legal framework with
investment advisers.”20 
B.  The Volcker Rule 
On March 3, 2010, the U.S. Department of the Treasury proposed
legislative language to implement the Volcker Rule, which would, in
amending the Bank Holding Company Act of 195621 by adding sections
13 and 13a, serve to limit proprietary trading by banking institutions and 
constrain the overall size of financial companies.22 
17. See Matthew P. Allen, A Lesson from History, Roosevelt to Obama—The Evolution 
of Broker-Dealer Regulation: From Self-Regulation, Arbitration, and Suitability to Federal 
Regulation, Litigation, and Fiduciary Duty, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 54 (2010). 
18. See, e.g., Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the
Mutual Fund Directors Forum Ninth Annual Policy Conference: Regulating Broker-Dealers 
and Investment Advisers: Demarcation or Harmonization? (May 5, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch050509ebw.htm (“Congress should throw both 
statutes on the floor, select what is best in each and cover any holes through which the 
floor boards show.”). 
19. See, e.g., Blaine F. Aikin, SEC’s Aguilar Urges Fiduciary Standard, INVESTMENT
NEWS (June 7, 2009), http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/2009 
0607/REG/306079996 (“There is only one fiduciary standard, and it means that a
fiduciary has an affirmative obligation to put a client’s interests above his or her own.”). 
But see Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the Investment 
Advisers Association Annual Conference: SEC’s Oversight of the Adviser Industry
Bolsters Investor Protection (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spch050709laa.htm (rejecting harmonization and analyzing how brokers who provide 
advice should be treated). 
 20. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 71. 
21. 12 U.S.C §§ 1841–1850 (2006). 
22. See Volcker Rule, supra note 4; Mattingly & Christie, supra note 4. 
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1.  Prohibition of Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships  
with Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds 
Section 13 would prohibit certain financial firms from engaging in 
proprietary trading or entering into certain relationships with hedge funds 
and private equity funds.  In particular, appropriate federal banking agencies 
would be empowered to “jointly prohibit proprietary trading by an 
insured depository institution or by a company that controls an insured 
depository institution or is treated as a bank holding company for
purposes of this Act.”23  These same banking agencies would also be
authorized to “jointly prohibit sponsoring and investing in hedge funds 
and private equity funds by an insured depository institution or by a 
company that controls an insured depository institution or is treated as a 
bank holding company for purposes of the Bank Holding Company
Act.”24  The term proprietary trading, as defined by the Volcker Rule,
means
purchasing or selling, or otherwise acquiring and disposing of, stocks, bond, 
options, commodities, derivatives, or other financial instruments for the
institution’s or company’s own trading book, and not on behalf of a customer,
as part of market making activities, or otherwise in connection with or in 
facilitation of customer relationships, including hedging activities related to the 
foregoing.25 
Finally, no insured depository institution—or company that controls an 
insured depository institution—or bank holding company that
“serves, directly or indirectly, as the investment manager or investment
adviser” to hedge funds or private equity funds may enter into a covered 
transaction, as defined in section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act,26 with 
23. Volcker Rule, supra note 4, § 13(a).  The term bank holding company means “any
company which has control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a
bank holding company by virtue of this chapter.”  12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). 
24. Volcker Rule, supra note 4, § 13(b). 
‘Sponsoring’ a fund means— 
(A)  serving as a general partner, managing member, or trustee of a fund; 
(B) in any manner selecting or controlling (or having employees, officers, or
directors, or agents who constitute) a majority of the directors, trustees or 
management of a fund; or  
(C) sharing with a fund, for corporate, marketing, promotional, or other
purposes, the same name or a variation of the same name. 
Id. § 13(f)(3)(A)–(C). 
25. Volcker Rule, supra note 4, § 13(f)(1). 
26. Id. § 13(b)(2). The term covered transaction is generally defined as (1) an
extension of credit to an affiliate, (2) a purchase of, or an investment in, a security issued by
 999
BUNTING POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/26/2011 11:23 AM       
 
 
   
 
 









   
 




    
         




    
    
 
   
   




such funds or “provide custody, securities lending, and other prime
brokerage services to” such funds.27 
Importantly, the Volcker Rule leaves open the possibility that similar 
regulations will apply to certain nonbank financial entities in stipulating
that the Federal Reserve Board may adopt further “rules imposing
additional capital requirements and specifying additional quantitative 
limits for nonbank financial companies under its supervision that engage 
in proprietary trading and sponsoring and investing in hedge funds and
private equity funds.”28  As will become more transparent in the analysis
to follow, we view the possibility of similar regulatory intrusions upon 
the proprietary trading activities of nonbank financial companies, as 
suggested by what appears to be a sort of catchall provision, with a 
certain measure of suspicion and opposition.
2.  Concentration Limits on Large Financial Firms 
Finally, the Volcker Rule would further amend the Bank Holding
Company Act by adding new section 13a, which imposes concentration 
limits on large financial firms.29  In particular, a financial company30 
would no longer be free to “merge or consolidate with, acquire all or
substantially all of the assets of, or otherwise acquire control of, another 
company if the acquiring financial company’s total consolidated liabilities 
upon consummation of the transaction would exceed 10% of the
aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies.”31 
In offering a critique of the various policy proposals summarized
above and setting forth an alternative framework that we humbly suggest 
better addresses several of the underlying issues motivating these 
proposed statutory amendments, the present Article proceeds as follows:
Part II constructs a simple conceptual framework.  Difficult-to-price 
an affiliate, (3) a purchase of an asset from an affiliate, (4) the acceptance of a security
issued by an affiliate as collateral for an extension of credit to any person or company, and 
(5) the issuance of a guarantee, acceptance or letter of credit on behalf of the affiliate. See
12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7)(A)–(E) (2006). 
27. Volcker Rule, supra note 4, § 13(b)(2)(A). 
 28. Id. § 13(e)(1).
29. Id. § 13a. 
30. “‘Financial company’ means any insured depository institution, any bank holding
company, any other company that controls an insured depository institution, any nonbank 
financial company supervised by the Board, and any foreign bank or company treated as
a bank holding company for purposes of this Act.”  Id. § 13a(c)(1). 
31. Id. § 13a(a).  “‘Liabilities’ equals a financial company’s total risk-weighted assets,
as determined pursuant to the risk-based capital rules applicable to bank holding companies, 
as adjusted to reflect exposures that are deducted from regulatory capital, less the company’s
total regulatory capital under the risk-based capital rules applicable to bank holding
companies.”  Id. § 13a(c)(2).  “For a foreign-based financial company, ‘liabilities’ equals
only the total risk-weighted assets of its U.S. operations.” Id. § 13a(c)(2).
1000
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securities and the relevant financial players are defined.  Two behavioral 
effects are then highlighted as most important with respect to securities 
trading.  In Part III, we argue that the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA) safe harbor should not apply to investment banks issuing
difficult-to-price securities.  We also advocate for the return of the private
investment banking partnership as the most sensible way in which to get 
the relevant behavioral incentives right vis-à-vis the bank and its clients, 
and we propose two regulatory measures designed to induce such banks 
to structure themselves as private partnerships in a world where they
would otherwise be free to publicly incorporate.  Finally, Part IV sets 
forth what we think should be the relevant duties owed to investors by
investment advisers and broker-dealers, respectively, and it argues, in
addition, that the Volcker Rule’s push to proscribe proprietary trading is 
misplaced insofar as it might apply specifically to broker-dealers and
investment advisers.
II. A SIMPLE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A simple conceptual framework is first set forth, which involves 
(1) defining what we mean by a difficult-to-price security, as well as
introducing the relevant financial players, and (2) highlighting two 
important behavioral or psychological effects that we believe ought to 
guide rulemaking in the context of securities trading. 
A.  Constituent Elements 
Part II.A.1–2 introduces (1) the distinction between easy-to-price and 
difficult-to-price securities and (2) the relevant financial players. 
1.  Two Categories of Financial Instruments 
Suppose that the set of marketable financial instruments can be
divided conceptually into two distinct categories: (1) easy to price and 
(2) difficult to price.32  Whether a security can be classified as one or the 
other is assumed to depend upon three factors33: (1) its own market 
32. In practice, of course, this variable will be continuous, with most securities falling 
somewhere along an ease-of-pricing continuum.  For ease of exposition, however, we confine
the discussion to the discrete case. 
33. Note that these categories generally correspond to the three types of valuation 
techniques commonly used by market participants: (1) mark-to-market, (2) mark-to-matrix,
 1001













   
 
   
    
      
    






   
 
   
   
 
 
liquidity—defined as the probability that the next trade in the relevant
market is executed at a price equal to the last, (2) the liquidity of markets
for similar asset classes, and (3) the ease with which mandated disclosures
are mapped onto the security’s true risk-return profile.34 
To amplify this definition, we consider a few examples.  The issuance 
of common stock by a well-known, seasoned issuer in a well-established 
industry would be easy to price under this definition.35  The stock of 
such companies tends to trade in well-organized markets, with large 
volumes of transactions executed each and every day.  Many of the “risk 
factors” confronted by a particular company are shared by other 
corporations competing in the same industry, corporations whose stocks 
also trade in similarly well-organized, highly liquid markets. The
various theoretical models that have been employed to “price” stocks are
comparatively straightforward and routinely rely on readily available, 
publicly disclosed salient information.36  The mathematical techniques 
and (3) mark-to-model.  See Manmohan Singh & Mustafa Saiyid, Credit Market Turmoil 
Makes Securities Valuation Key, IMF SURV. MAG., Feb. 2008, at 24.  As explained by
Manmohan Singh and Mustafa Saiyid: 
   Mark-to-market refers to the use of quoted prices for actively traded, identical 
assets.  Mark-to-matrix is a technique used for less actively traded assets, such 
as emerging market securities, municipal bonds, and asset-backed securities 
(ABS).  It involves estimating [a credit spread] of the asset by relating it to a 
more actively traded instrument that can be priced easily. 
   The third method of pricing is the mark-to-model technique that 
market participants are often forced to use for the least liquid assets, including 
real estate, private equity investments, and complex structured securities such as 
certain tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  Mark-to-model 
assigns prices based on statistical inference. 
Id.
34. In what follows, the term risk refers to circumstances where the decisionmaker 
can assign mathematical probabilities to perceived randomness; by contrast, the term
uncertainty refers to circumstances where this randomness cannot be expressed in terms of 
exact mathematical probabilities.  See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT
20 (1921).  See generally  JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF 
UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION (1992); JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, THE ECONOMICS OF 
UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION (1989). 
35. Stocks are defined more by uncertainty than risk.  As opposed to risk, there are 
few models that attempt to model uncertainty or, alternatively, that do so well.  Stocks 
are therefore defined as easy to price not only because of the existence of liquid, well-
functioning equity markets but also because the extent to which the true price depends on 
uncertainty as opposed to risk makes the pricing exercise so difficult as to render good
theoretical models virtually nonexistent.  In that sense, it may be that easy-to-price 
securities are better classified as impossible-to-price securities.  We have chosen the term easy
as opposed to impossible, however, to capture the fact that in practice, little, if any, effort
need be exerted to price this type of security.
36. Most stock valuation methods involve discounting the profits—dividends,
earnings, or cash flows—that the stock will yield in the foreseeable future, as well as 
upon disposition.  The discounted rate typically includes a risk premium that is based on the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  Similarly, fundamental valuation models also exist 
that attempt to forecast returns from a company’s expected future financial performance
1002
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applied to price these stocks on the basis of this publicly disclosed 
information are generally familiar to, and understood by, most
competent hedge fund and private equity managers, investment advisers, 
and other such investment professionals. 
Corporate bonds present a more difficult case.  Corporate bonds are 
“inherently illiquid and, except for shortly after issuance,” tend to trade 
infrequently.37  Moreover, there is not always another issuance to which 
this particular debt can be readily compared.  In addition, there are now
underlying risks—as opposed to uncertainties—that tend to complicate 
the pricing exercise; in particular, the price of a corporate bond depends 
not only on general interest rate risk but also on the specific credit risk of
the issuing company—and if the bond is convertible into stock, on its
equity risk as well.  Therefore, as compared with stock valuation models, 
greater technical expertise is required to incorporate, in some meaningful 
way, these known risks into a coherent and competent pricing model.
Further, because the regulatory disclosures required of most U.S. issuers
arguably are insufficient to provide investors with a full and comprehensive 
picture of a company’s total risk exposures, greater logistical effort 
might also be needed in the form of independent research and data
collection.38  The typical investment professional is not necessarily 
and differ from CAPM-type models that conceive of expected return as the sum of a 
risk-free rate plus a premium for exposure to return variability.  The Estep T-Model, for
example, specifies returns earned by holders of a company stock in terms of accounting 
variables readily obtainable from the company’s financial statements.  See, e.g., Preston 
W. Estep, A New Method for Valuing Common Stocks, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 
1985, at 26, 26–27; Preston W. Estep, Cash Flows, Asset Values, and Investment Returns, 29
J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 17, 18 (2003).  But see Hubert J. Dwyer & Richard Lynn, Is the 
Estep T-Model Consistently Useful?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 1992, at 82, 82. 
37. See Michael Decker, FINRA’s TRACE and the U.S. Corporate Bond Market 2 
(Sept. 11, 2007) (unpublished presentation) (on file with Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association). 
38. In July 2002, the National Association of Securities Dealers introduced the Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) “in an effort to increase price transparency in
the U.S. corporate debt market.  The system captures and disseminates consolidated
information on secondary market transactions in publicly traded TRACE-eligible securities
(investment grade, high yield and convertible corporate debt)—representing all over-the-
counter market activity in these bonds.”  TRACE Corporate Bond Data, FINRA, http:// 
www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/MarketTransparency/TRACE/CorporateBondData (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2011).  Its efficacy is hotly debated, however.  See, e.g., Hendrik
Bessembinder et al., Market Transparency, Liquidity Externalities, and Institutional Trading
Costs in Corporate Bonds, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 251, 283 (2006) (finding dealer markups 
have decreased following the introduction of TRACE); Amy K. Edwards et al., Corporate 
Bond Market Transaction Costs and Transparency, 62 J. FIN. 1421, 1422 (2007) (same). But 
see Robert Bloomfield & Maureen O’Hara, Market Transparency: Who Wins and 
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endowed with all of the technical skills required to successfully implement
this type of analysis on a large scale. 
Lastly, qualifying as difficult to price under our definition, consider 
certain types of structured products, such as a credit-default obligation 
(CDO) comprised exclusively of mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
Very often MBS will be “inherently illiquid at the time of issuance . . .
because each debt tranche had different levels of credit enhancement and 
the composition (and quality) of the underlying collateral” varies from 
one deal to the next.39  Moreover, the illiquidity of these complex-
structured securities is often compounded or exacerbated by a lack of
transparency as to the exposure to underlying nonprime mortgage loans.40 
And as for valuation, although pricing an MBS might appear a relatively
straightforward exercise—a fixed-rate mortgage offering fixed, nominal 
payments that are known and disclosed, suggesting that fixed-rate MBS 
prices ought to be governed by pure discount bond prices—the complexity 
arises from the fact that residential mortgagees in the United States have
the option to pay more than the required monthly payment (curtailment) or,
alternatively, to pay off the loan in its entirety (prepayment); hence,
“MBS investors are implicitly writing a call option on a corresponding 
fixed-rate bond.”41 
In particular, the number of homeowners who repay as such tends to 
increase when interest rates decrease because, for instance, homeowners
can now refinance their mortgages at a lower fixed interest rate.  The
speed at which mortgages are prepaid is also impacted by other non-
interest-related variables as well, such as homeowner mobility and inertia. 
Because the links between prepayment risk and these other related 
factors are difficult to quantify, the timing and cash flow from an MBS
are both risky and uncertain,42 which makes the task of calculating a
theoretical price for the CDO—with the cash flows from various MBS
allocated to various tranches of the CDO according to complicated, deal-
Who Loses?, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 5, 8, 18–20 (1999) (arguing that market liquidity—as 
measured by the inverse of the width of the bid-ask spread—may decrease with increased 
transparency in a market).
39. See Singh & Saiyid, supra note 33, at 24. 
40. Id.
41. Jacob Boudoukh et al., Pricing Mortgage-Backed Securities in a Multifactor 
Interest Rate Environment: A Multivariate Density Estimation Approach, 10 REV. FIN.
STUD. 405, 406 (1997); see also Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, The Alchemy of
CDO Credit Ratings, 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 617, 621 (2009). See generally Chris Downing 
et al., Is the Market for Mortgage-Backed Securities a Market for Lemons?, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 2457, 2458 (2009). 
42. Further complicating matters, prepayments are also likely to be a function of
economic growth, which is, in turn, correlated with turnover in the housing market, inflation,
unemployment, regulatory risk, and demographic trends, including shifting individual-risk 
profiles. 
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specific rules—a very difficult problem in mathematical finance; indeed, 
it is one that has, up to this point, continued to elude a closed-form 
solution.43 
2.  The Financial Players
The relevant financial players in this conceptual framework are now
introduced.  An investment bank issues/underwrites financial instruments. 
The investment bank sells these instruments—perhaps via a broker-
dealer—to investment advisers in the primary market. Investment
advisers decide how to invest the hard-earned money of lay investors, 
purchasing from investment banks in the primary market and broker-dealers 
in the secondary market a variety of different financial instruments— 
including those that are difficult to price.  Rather than invest indirectly
with the investment adviser, investors may also choose to deal directly
with broker-dealers in purchasing financial instruments in the secondary 
market.  The broker-dealer is conceptualized as implementing a Walrasian
tâtonnement mechanism.44 
Note that the modern “investment bank” can often comprise all three
financial players; within the same financial institution, a security can be 
issued by an investment banker, marketed by its sales division, and sold 
by one of its own broker-dealers to a client, whose assets are managed 
by an investment adviser employed by the very same bank.  To preview
what is to come, the Article suggests that this bundling of different 
players within a single institutional entity, this blurring of the lines, leads 
to important and entirely unacceptable conflicts of interest that ought to 
be eliminated via the sorts of sharp line-drawing exercises prescribed by
43. See, e.g., Boudoukh et al., supra note 41, at 409–19; Singh & Saiyid, supra
note 33, at 24. 
44. See generally Patrick Joyce, The Walrasian Tâtonnement Mechanism and 
Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 416 (1984) (conducting experiments that show that such 
auction mechanisms are stable, exhibiting strong convergence properties and efficiency levels
averaging better than 97%).  To the extent that securities markets should be made to conform
to the conditions of this experiment, the experimental tâtonnement mechanism possessed the
following characteristics: “[T]here [was] only one price at any time; there [was] an
information mechanism notifying all traders of that price; there [was] a mechanism for 
determining quantities offered for sale and purchase at the price; and transactions
at nonequilibrating prices [were] forbidden.”  Id. at 416–17.  Additionally, the Walrasian
pricing rule was used by the “auctioneer”—“the change in price [had] the same sign as 
excess demand.”  Id. at 416. 
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the original Glass-Steagall Act of 1933,45 although the lines advocated 
here are not necessarily the same, nor are they motivated by precisely
the same underlying considerations and concerns. 
The preceding discussion is summarized visually in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1
THE FINANCIAL PLAYERS 
B.  Two Important Behavioral Effects 
A host of different terms and frameworks in psychology and
behavioral finance are available to describe the various effects at work in
securities trading, including, inter alia, size effects,46 overconfidence 
effects,47 and disposition effects.48  Rather than glibly state that such
behavioral phenomena exist or, alternatively, attempt to amass some 
definitive, all-encompassing catalogue of all such effects, it is valuable,
we think, to make a positive assumption as to which few are likely to be 
most important.  To that end, the two effects that we believe ought to
45. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
46. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Berk, A Critique of Size-Related Anomalies, 8 REV. FIN.
STUD. 275, 276 (1995). 
47. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, 
Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 289 (2001). 
48. See, e.g., Martin Weber & Colin F. Camerer, The Disposition Effect in Securities 
Trading: An Experimental Analysis, 33 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 167, 167–68 (1998). 
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loom largest when rulemaking with respect to securities trading are 
(1) the house money effect and (2) the earned money effect.
1.  The House Money Effect
The house money effect is an example of a mental accounting in
which agents mentally keep quantities of money in artificially separate 
accounts.49  Agents who exhibit the house money effect consider house 
money gains as distinct from the rest of their wealth and therefore are 
more likely to gamble these gains than would be the case otherwise.  The 
house money effect is consistent with prospect theory; specifically,
suppose that the investor invests $100,000 in an investment where, with 
probability p, the investment doubles, and with probability (1 – p), the 
investment is worth zero where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.  In addition, assume that an
investment professional keeps a proportion of the profits, σ, where 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
The payoffs for the investor, PI, and investment professional, PIP, 
respectively, can be represented as follows50: 
PI = p100(1 – σ) + (1 – p) (-100) = 100[(2 – σ)p – 1]
and 
PIP = p100σ + (1 – p) (0) = 100σp 
Observe that no matter what the expected rate of return on the
investment is—for all feasible values of p—the investment is profitable 
for the investment professional, provided, of course, that the professional
receives a nonzero proportion of profits—or equivalently, 100σp > 0 for 
all p > 0 and σ > 0.  This is true because the investment professional 
views the investor’s money as house money.  It is distinct as compared
with the investment professional’s own personal wealth, and therefore it 
is kept in a separate account.  Accordingly, the investor’s losses are not
49. See Richard H. Thaler & Eric J. Johnson, Gambling with the House Money and 
Trying To Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice, 36 J. INST.
MGMT. SCI. 643, 657 (1990). See generally Lucy F. Ackert et al., An Experimental 
Examination of the House Money Effect in a Multi-Period Setting, 9 EXPERIMENTAL
ECON. 5 (2006) (discussing the house money effect in a financial setting). 
50. Payoffs correspond to the risk neutral von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
representation for preferences over discrete lotteries.  See Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263,
280 (1979). 
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the investment professional’s losses.51  Furthermore, note that the
investment is profitable for the investor if and only if (2 – σ)p – 1 > 0, or 
equivalently, if and only if p > 1/(2 – σ).  The investment must have a 
better-than-even chance of doubling in value for it to be profitable for 
the investor; that is, the probability p must at least satisfy p > ½. 
Similarly, the greater the investment professional’s take, σ, the fewer the 
investments that the investor will find attractive; indeed, where σ = 1, the
investor finds no investments profitable, which makes sense.
The purpose of this stylized example is simply to highlight the extent 
to which preferences over the same investment may differ between the
investor and the investment professional for reasons having nothing to 
do with preferences over risk as traditionally defined.52  Rather, the 
difference in preferences stems from how these two individuals “perceive”
their respective baseline levels of wealth.  For the investor, that baseline is
$100,000; for the investment professional, by contrast, it is $0.  Excessive
risk-taking behavior, defined as gambling on investments that the investor
would not otherwise find profitable, is therefore more likely to be observed
the greater the extent to which the money with which the investment
professional is entrusted represents, in the professional’s own mind, not his
or her own money but someone else’s.
2.  The Earned Money Effect 
Pushing further the underlying theme of the preceding discussion, how 
an individual feels about a certain sum of money will likely depend not
only on whether that sum represents one’s own money or house money
but also on the level of personal effort that has been exerted in the past 
to acquire that sum.  In other words, all else equal, the “value” that an 
individual places on, say, $100,000 will vary depending on whether, for
example, the individual has spent several years working hard to earn that 
sum or, alternatively, received that sum as the proceeds of a winning 
lottery ticket.  It seems quite plausible that one will value the hard-
fought dollar more than the dollar that comes easy, holding dearer the 
dollar that is the product of blood, sweat, and tears than the dollar that 
was obtained without ever lifting a finger.  Indeed, this behavioral effect 
can be properly conceptualized as a variant of the “endowment effect”— 
the hypothesis that people will value a good more once a property right
51. Formally, this corresponds to the fact that where the investment is worth zero, 
the investment professional’s losses are equal to zero, and the investor’s losses equal to -100.
52. For a more detailed treatment of preferences over risk and uncertainty,
see generally ITZHAK GILBOA, THEORY OF DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2009). 
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to it has been established53—or alternatively, as a variant of the “sunk 
cost effect”—manifested where there exists a greater tendency to
continue an endeavor once an investment in effort has been made.54 
In the context of the foregoing investment opportunity, if we assume 
that the investment professional is forced to take a loss equal in value to 
the investor’s, then the financial reality of the transaction with respect to 
the investor and the investment professional appears equivalent.  But of 
course, this is not entirely true.  Putting to the side considerations of 
diminishing marginal utility of wealth,55 psychologically the $100,000
loss will surely weigh more heavily on the individual for whom this
represents ten years of savings than on the individual for whom this
represents yesterday’s trading gains—the thought of all those years of 
hard work lost, all that effort expended only to be squandered so,
causing the investor to “value” the magnitude of the loss more than will
the investment professional for whom that sum might represent trading 
gains earned over the past several days or, perhaps, even hours or
minutes.56 
This so-called earned money effect can be formally represented by 
writing the investment professional’s preferences with respect to the
investment opportunity as follows: 
PIP = ph(100) – (1 – p)100 = (h(100) + 100)p – 100
As long as the function h(·) is strictly convex—and thus, h(100) > 100— 
preferences over investments are once again misaligned.  Investment 
professionals will find certain investments attractive that investors would 
53. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1338–39 (1990) (finding randomly assigned 
owners of a mug required significantly more money to part with the mug—around $7—than 
randomly assigned buyers were willing to pay to acquire it—around $3). 
54. Interestingly, in their original pioneering work, Kahneman and Tversky suggested
that sunk costs have the opposite effect, inducing a “loss frame” that, in turn, leads to 
risk-seeking behavior.  See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 50, at 268–69.  It has been 
shown, however, that sunk costs also result in risk aversion. See generally Marcel Zeelenberg 
& Eric van Dijk, A Reverse Sunk Cost Effect in Risky Decision Making: Sometimes We Have
Too Much Invested To Gamble, 18 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 677 (1997) (showing that incurring
“behavioral sunk costs” appears to increase risk-aversive choices—what they call a “reverse
sunk cost effect”). 
55. Marginal utility of wealth effects can be controlled for by increasing the loss
incurred by the investment professional.  Akin to the endowment effect, the claim is that 
these wealth effects alone, however, will not fully explain the observed differences in 
valuation.  See Kahneman et al., supra note 53, at 1342. 
56. See Zeelenberg & van Dijk, supra note 54, at 678–80. 
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not—again, for reasons having nothing to do with differing marginal 
utilities of wealth or preferences over risk but rather because what is at
stake for the investment professional simply does not have the same
intrinsic psychological value as it does for the investor. 
In order to cure these misalignments stemming from the house money 
effect and the earned money effect, the investment professional must be 
made to suffer a “real loss.”  Specifically, the approach is to require that 
the professional put some of his or her own money into the mix; if the 
investor has invested $X ≥ 0, then the investment professional must be
made to similarly invest $Y ≥ 0 of his or her own money.  Interpreting
the parameters as above, the investment professional’s preferences over
investment opportunities can thus be written as follows: 
PIP= pY + (1 – p) (-Y) + pσh(X)
Rearranging terms, the investment professional now finds the investment 
profitable if and only if:
p > ½ > Y / (2Y + h(X)σ)
Observe that the larger Y is with respect to h(X) and σ, the greater the
extent to which the investment professional’s preferences correspond to
the investor’s preferences, where we should recall that the investor finds 
the investment attractive only if p > ½.57  Similarly, note that the smaller 
the proportion of profits retained by the investment professional 
(σ small) and the more the investment professional treats the investor’s
money as hard earned (the less convex the function h(·)), the greater the
extent to which preferences match; indeed, where σ = h(X) = 0, preferences 
match exactly. 
a.  The Earned Money Effect as It Impacts Research Effort 
Now suppose that the investment professional can exert research effort 
e ≥ 0 at unit cost to determine the true outcome of the investment: Y or -Y, 
where the decision to exert costly effort must be made before the true 
outcome of the investment is revealed.  If the outcome is -Y, then the 
investment professional will, of course, not proceed with this particular
investment.  On the other hand, if the outcome is Y, then with effort e, 
now sunk, the investment professional might as well pocket Y, and so
the expected payoff of research effort therefore is pY –  e.  Hence, the 
investment professional will exert e if and only if:
pY – (1 – p)Y < pY – e 
57. See supra Part II.B.1.
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or equivalently, if and only if: 
(1 – p)Y > e 
Assume that the earned money effect characterizes the securities trading 
environment.  Interpreting the function h(·) exactly the same as above, it 
is easy to show that the trader now chooses to exert e if and only if:
pY – (1 – p)h(Y) < pY – e 
or equivalently, if and only if58: 
(1 – p)h(Y) > e 
Because the left-hand side of this second equation is smaller than the 
left-hand side of the first equation, which was derived where behavioral
effects were assumed absent—because h(Y) < Y—the set of investments 
opportunities (p, Y), where the investment professional chooses not to 
invest in research effort in order to determine the true nature of the 
investment opportunities, has increased.  This is true because the losses
are not deemed as great, and so the investment professional is less willing to
pay to avoid them than would otherwise be true were such behavioral 
effects not present.
As will be emphasized repeatedly in what follows, we believe that this 
research effort should be encouraged and incentivized wherever possible.
This simple analysis demonstrates why.  Although it is admittedly an 
empirical question in each particular instance, depending on research
costs and the probability and magnitude of the investment opportunities 
at issue, the general thrust of the preceding discussion is hopefully 
clear—that behavioral effects exist that discourage profitable investment
58. This problem is magnified with the presence of optimistic traders.  See, e.g., 
Oren Bar-Gill, The Evolution and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 490, 490–91 (2006); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life 
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806, 813–14 (1980).  Formally, suppose 
traders’ subjective probability that the investment doubles is s(p), where, importantly,
s(p) > p.  It can be shown that the trader now spends e if and only if: 
s(p)Y – (1 – s(p))h(Y) < pY – e 
or equivalently, if and only if: 
(1 – s(p))h(Y) > e + (s(p) – p)Y
Comparing this inequality with the expression derived above, because the left side of the
equation is even smaller and the right side even larger, it follows that the set of investment
opportunities in which the traders choose not to exert effort has further increased. 
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research.  These effects can be mitigated, or eliminated altogether, by 
opening up investment professionals to the possibility of incurring “real
losses” $Y.  How we might go about actually doing this in practice is 
taken up in Part III. 
III. INVESTMENT BANKS
This Part sets for itself three distinct objectives: (1) to argue that the
PSLRA safe harbor should not apply to investment banks that issue/ 
underwrite difficult-to-price securities, (2) to advocate for the return of 
investment banking partnerships as the most sensible way in which to
get the incentives right vis-à-vis the investment bank and its clients, and
(3) to propose two regulatory measures designed to induce investment
banks to structure themselves as private partnerships in a world where
such banks are otherwise free to publicly incorporate. 
A.  Eliminate PSLRA Safe Harbor Protection for    
Difficult-to-Price Securities 
The core of the safe harbor provision is the section that sets forth the
circumstances under which a forward-looking statement is immune from 
civil legal liability.59  In particular, in a private civil action brought on 
the basis of an untrue statement of material fact or an omission of a 
material fact, an issuer will not be held liable with respect to a forward-
looking statement—whether written or oral60—if it meets any one of 
three alternative tests: (1) it is accompanied by meaningful cautionary
language,61 (2) it is immaterial,62 or (3) the defendant lacked the requisite
state of mind to commit fraud.63 
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2006).  The safe harbor provisions are applicable only
with respect to private civil litigation and do not apply where enforcement actions are
brought by the SEC or where criminal prosecutions are brought by the Department of
Justice.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2006). 
60. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1), 78u-5(c)(1). 
61. A mere boilerplate is insufficient.  See, e.g., In re Computer Assocs. Sec. 
Litig., 75 F. Supp. 2d 68, 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding cautionary statements “there can
be no assurances that future results will be achieved” and “[there are] important factors 
that could cause actual results to differ materially” to be general boilerplate disclaimers
and therefore insufficient to bring the statements within the safe harbor); In re Boeing 
Sec. Litig., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1168 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (holding that where the company
had predicted a “near-term decline in productivity,” its statements describing the cause 
of the company’s then-current production problems did nothing to “warn[] investors of
factors that could cause a steeper decline in the company’s productivity or an extension 
of that period of inefficiency”); see also 141 Cong. Rec. H13703 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 
1995) (statement of Hon. Bob Barr) (“[C]autionary statements must convey substantive 
information about factors that realistically could cause results to differ . . . such as . . . 
information about the issuer’s business.”); cf. Harris v. IVAX Corp., 998 F. Supp. 1449,
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Part III.A.1–3 provides three distinct critiques of the PSLRA safe 
harbor as applied to an investment bank that issues/underwrites difficult-
to-price financial instruments: (1) an economic critique, (2) a legal critique,
and (3) a behavioral critique. 
1454 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (deeming such factors as “increased competition and the purchasing
decisions of existing customers, the volatile nature of the generic drug industry itself and 
the unpredictability of the degree and timing of price competition, the speed of the
restructuring of the [company’s] production facilities, mistaken estimates and assumptions 
concerning customer inventory shelf stock adjustments, [and] other information
identified in [the company’s] SEC filing” not impermissible boilerplate), aff’d, 182 
F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 1999).  Moreover, it is clear from the legislative history that to be
protected, an issuer need not have included all factors that might have materially affected
the predictive disclosures; indeed, as the Conference Report states, “[f]ailure to include
the particular factor that ultimately causes the forward-looking statement not to come
true will not mean that the statement is not protected by the safe harbor.”  H.R. REP. NO. 
104-369, at 44 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 743; see also Harris, 182 
F.3d at 807 (“[W]hen an investor has been warned of risks of a significance similar to 
that actually realized, she is sufficiently on notice of the danger of the investment to 
make an intelligent decision about it according to her own preferences for risk and
reward.”).  Similarly, the doctrine does not apply to statements of current or historical 
fact.  See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 708–10 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing 
in part district court’s dismissal of complaint because it could not find as a matter of law 
that defendants’ representations were projections and not misrepresentations of
historical fact); In re Valujet, Inc., Sec. Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1472, 1479 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
(concluding that because plaintiffs did not allege that defendants “fraudulently
announced expansion plans and then failed to follow through on these plans” but rather 
alleged “misrepresentation of existing facts,” specifically that “FAA approval was required
before expansion could be consummated,” statements and omissions were therefore not 
“forward-looking”). 
62. Courts’ preferred approach for dismissing claims arguing for safe harbor protection
seems to be to view the challenged statements as nothing but “puffery” and therefore 
immaterial. See, e.g., San Leandro Emergency Med. Grp. Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip 
Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1996) (declaring statements that issuer was
“‘optimistic’ about its earnings” and “‘expected’ [good sales]” to be “puffery” and therefore 
immaterial); Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 283 n.12 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding 
statement “United Jersey looks to the future with great optimism” to be “inactionable 
puffing” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1427–28 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding vague and therefore immaterial a 
“general, nonspecific statement of optimism or hope that a trend will continue”).  Courts 
have also found specific forward-looking statements to be immaterial as a matter of 
law—and thus not actionable—where the statement is meaningless. See, e.g., Karacand
v. Edwards, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1252 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that “surprises” are, by
definition, unexpected and that the statement “‘we don’t expect any [surprises] in the 
[upcoming] quarter’ is therefore meaningless and immaterial”).
63. This standard—actual knowledge of falsity—is more demanding than is
traditional under SEC Rule 10b-5, which courts have interpreted as creating private liability
for statements that are merely reckless. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory Safe 
Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements After Two and a Half Years: Has It Changed 
the Law? Has It Achieved What Congress Intended?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 645, 661 (1998).
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1.  The Economic Critique 
In terms of the quantity of voluntary disclosure, the safe harbor
provision, in restricting investors’ capacity to sue where projections are
not met—thus decreasing the legal costs of such disclosure—should 
make managers more willing to issue a greater number of good-news 
forecasts.64  Likewise, the expected legal costs associated with failing to 
achieve management forecasts may also influence the form in which
forward-looking information is communicated to the market.  Managers 
are hesitant to announce forecasts that have a high probability of proving 
to be incorrect ex post.  Because the safe harbor provision insulates
issuers from legal liability where projections are not met, this provision 
should therefore serve to increase disclosure of long-horizon forecasts,
as well as those forecasts that provide more specific or detailed estimates
of anticipated results. 
In terms of the quality of voluntary disclosure, however, recognize 
that prospective disclosures are useful only to the extent that the 
information disclosed is (1) credible—free of intentional bias or
misrepresentation—and (2) precise—free of extraneous noise.  It is not 
hard to imagine a scenario where managers perceive safe harbor 
protection as a “license to lie” and as a consequence are thus overly
optimistic in their statements to investors, especially, as will be 
discussed in greater detail below, where it is unlikely that investors
understand the full import of the disclosures being made in the first 
place.65  In other words, because the litigation environment imposes an 
asymmetric loss function on issuers insofar as an issuer is more likely to 
64. Scholars have shown that managers are more likely to preempt large negative
earnings surprises than other types of earnings news.  See Douglas J. Skinner, Why Firms
Voluntarily Disclose Bad News, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 38, 39–40 (1994) (arguing that managers
have an incentive to voluntarily disclose bad news that prepare investors for a
disappointing earnings announcement).  Because the Act reduces the marginal benefit of 
voluntarily disclosing bad news, the argument is that managers will issue fewer bad-news
forecasts.  See Douglas J. Skinner, Do the SEC’s Safe Harbor Provisions Encourage 
Forward-Looking Disclosures?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July–Aug. 1995, at 38, 38, 41, 43; see 
also Ron Kasznik & Baruch Lev, To Warn or Not To Warn: Management Disclosures in
the Face of an Earnings Surprise, 70 ACCT. REV. 113, 114–15, 133 (1995).  On the other
hand, other authors suggest that the voluntary disclosure of bad news may be a contributing
factor in securities litigation. See Jennifer Francis et al., Shareholder Litigation and 
Corporate Disclosures, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 137, 137 (1994); Douglas J. Skinner, Earnings 
Disclosures and Stockholder Lawsuits, 23 J. ACCT. & ECON. 249, 253–54 (1997).  From
this perspective, managers will therefore be more likely to issue bad-news forecasts after
the passage of the Act because the marginal cost of these announcements is reduced. 
65. See David Carey, Liar’s License: Securities Litigation ‘Reform’ Will Make It 
Easier To Cheat Investors, FIN. WORLD, Feb. 26, 1996, at 92, 92–93; see also Joseph A.
Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year’s Experience
(Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 97-1, 1997), available at http://securities.stanford. 
edu/research/studies/19970227firstyr_firstyr.html. 
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be sued if there is a large negative return at its earning announcement, 
this loss function may thereby encourage firms to forecast less
optimistically than would be true were there no such incentive to avoid 
litigation.66  Moreover, the mere threat of disclosure-related litigation 
may have the effect of causing managers to abstain from issuing
forecasts where it is relatively difficult to predict or anticipate future 
performance.  If litigation concerns are lessened by the existence of a 
safe harbor, managers may be more inclined to release forecasts where
earnings are volatile or, alternatively, are revealed only as a noisy signal.
As a result, management forecasts and other such mandated disclosures
are likely to be less accurate and less reliable with the availability of a
litigation safe harbor.67 
In short, the economic critique of the PSLRA safe harbor provision 
thus reduces to the claim that the expected benefits of the increase in the
66. Truthful disclosure of private information is not an equilibrium strategy insofar
as such disclosure is properly modeled as “cheap talk.”  See Michael Dobler, Incentives
for Risk Reporting—A Discretionary Disclosure and Cheap Talk Approach, 43 INT’L J.
ACCT. 184, 194 (2008).  Given imperfect monitoring, credible forecast disclosure can be
obtained, however, as a perfect public equilibrium in a repeated game.  This multiperiod
result requires (1) a manager whose focus is not purely short term, (2) a sufficiently long 
review phase, and (3) financial statements sufficient to perform the nominal/actual value
comparisons. See id. at 195.  The first two conditions coincide with empirical work verifying
substantial misreporting in the presence of short-term speculation or high manager
fluctuation. See Charles J. Hadlock & Gerald B. Lumer, Compensation, Turnover, and 
Top Management Incentives: Historical Evidence, 70 J. BUS. 153, 153–55 (1997); Ingmar 
Nyman, Stock Market Speculation and Managerial Myopia, 14 REV. FIN. ECON. 61, 61–62 
(2005).  The third requires credible disclosure of specific data to conduct a nominal/actual 
value comparison ex post.  Whether disclosed financial statements indeed allow for such a
comparison is doubtful in our view. 
67. There remains a question of whether the market’s response to management 
forecasts is consistent with its identifying the predictable bias in the forecasts; that is, in 
an environment where investors hold rational expectations, investors should be expected
to filter out the predicted bias when determining stock prices.  In an interesting paper, the 
efficiency of the market’s response is shown to vary with the type of forecast news.  See
Jonathan L. Rogers & Phillip Stocken, Credibility of Management Forecasts 2–3 (Rodney L.
White Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 07-02, 2003), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=401700.  For good-news forecasts, the market’s immediate response is
consistent with its viewing these forecasts with skepticism and adjusting for the predicted 
error.  Id. at 3.  The adjustment seems complete because the authors do not find the 
subsequent risk-adjusted returns associated with the predicted error.  Id.  For bad-news 
forecasts, by contrast, the market appears to take them at face value, even though these 
forecasts are predictably biased. Id.  Over time, however, the risk-adjusted returns are 
consistent with the market’s identifying the predicted error and modifying its valuation 
accordingly. Id.  Although no doubt a reassuring result, it does raise the question, Why
not just get the disclosures right in the first place rather than have to rely on market 
corrections to fix the defective disclosures on the back end?
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quantity of disclosures do not exceed the expected costs of the decrease
in the quality of such disclosures.  Or to put it more starkly, increased
disclosure in the context of firms that issue/underwrite difficult-to-price 
securities is not to be encouraged if, at the margin, such disclosure 
merely constitutes overly optimistic forecasts of returns, characterized
by significant volatility and made purely, or in large part, on the basis of
noisy signals.
2.  The Legal Critique 
Although Congress promulgated the safe harbor as part of a larger 
effort to thwart vexatious litigation, arguably it succeeded only in 
unwittingly inviting litigation on other unanticipated grounds68—in 
particular, litigation efforts designed to test the interpretation of the
legislation’s ambiguous language.69  Because courts often look to the 
“bespeaks caution” doctrine to clarify the statutory ambiguity, this 
has had the effect of creating a nonuniform safe harbor between the 
different circuits because that doctrine has been applied differently in the 
different circuits,70 with the resulting uncertainty in the law thus causing 
many issuers to remain cautious about making the kinds of forward-
looking statements ostensibly worthy of safe harbor protection—or so 
goes the legal critique. 
To amplify this legal uncertainty, many cases, for instance, treat the 
second prong—actual knowledge—as irrelevant if the first prong is 
satisfied.  At the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage, many 
decisions ignore allegations or even proof of actual knowledge that the 
projection was incorrect if the defendant identified the forward-looking 
statements as such and accompanied these statements with what the 
court finds to be meaningful cautionary statements.71  Basically, these
68. See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road
to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 337 (1996); 
Margaret A. Jacobs & Edward Felsenthal, Securities Bill May Prompt New Litigation, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1995, at B2. 
 69. The terms meaningful, important, and accompany are prime examples of this
oft-criticized ambiguity. See, e.g., Avery, supra note 68, at 355–57; see also Carl W.
Schneider & Jay A. Dubow, Forward-Looking Information—Navigating in the Safe 
Harbor, 51 BUS. LAW. 1071, 1089–95 (1996). 
70. See Allan Horwich, Cleaning the Murky Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking 
Statements: An Inquiry into Whether Actual Knowledge of Falsity Precludes the
Meaningful Cautionary Statement Defense, 35 J. CORP. L. 519, 522–23, 526–28 (2010). 
71. See, e.g., Miller v. Champion Enters., Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 672 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“[I]f the statement qualifies as ‘forward-looking’ and is accompanied by sufficient 
cautionary language, a defendant’s statement is protected regardless of the actual state of 
mind.”); see also In re Stone & Webster, Inc. Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 212 (1st Cir. 
2005) (noting that deceitful investors could escape liability upon a showing of a forward-
looking statement accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements); Amalgamated
1016
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cases rely on an explicit, rigid application of the disjunctive wording of 
the safe harbor.72  Some cases, however, treat the second prong as 
germane, even if the first prong has been or may be satisfied.73  These
cases do not directly address the disjunctive grammatical structure of the
statute.  Finally, a third perspective—which essentially seeks to meld the 
two prongs—holds that a finding of undisclosed actual knowledge of 
falsity means, ipso facto, that the cautionary statements were not 
meaningful.74 
a.  Courts that Allow Discovery To Proceed Effectively           
Eviscerate the Safe Harbor’s Essential Protections 
In addition to the uncertainty created by the unresolved statutory 
ambiguity, the force of the statutory safe harbor provision has been
further diluted by courts that have interpreted the provision so as to have 
severely weakened—if not eviscerated altogether—its essential protections; 
Bank v. Coca-Cola Co., No. Civ.A. 1:05-CV-1226, 2006 WL 2818973, at *4 (N.D. Ga. 
Sept. 29, 2006) (noting that once a court determines that a statement falls within the safe 
harbor, the state of mind of the defendant is irrelevant). 
72. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 371 (5th
Cir. 2004) (“The safe harbor has two independent prongs: one focusing on the defendant’s 
cautionary statements and the other on the defendant’s state of mind.”). 
73. See, e.g., Andropolis v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d
662, 676 (D. Colo. 2007) (stating, in dictum, that even a forward-looking statement made 
with meaningful cautionary statements may be actionable if there are sufficient 
allegations of actual knowledge of falsity of statement); Gargiulo v. Isolagen, Inc., 527 
F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“[T]hough some of the statements are forward-
looking and contain cautionary language, they are still not protected by the PLSRA safe
harbor because Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had actual knowledge of falsity.”);
Schaffer v. Evolving Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998) (“Plaintiffs
correctly argue that the safe harbor provision provides no refuge for Defendants who
make statements with ‘actual knowledge’ of their falsity.”). 
74. See, e.g., In re SeeBeyond Techs. Corp. Sec. Litig., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 
1165 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“If the forward-looking statement is made with actual knowledge 
that it is false or misleading, the accompanying cautionary language can only be 
meaningful if it either states the belief of the speaker that it is false or misleading or, at
the very least, clearly articulates the reasons why it is false or misleading.”); see
also Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 74 (D.D.C. 2008)
(following SeeBeyond in denying summary judgment because of issues of fact regarding
defendants’ intent that bore on whether cautionary statements were meaningful); In 
re Nash Finch Co. Sec. Litig., 502 F. Supp. 2d 861, 873 (D. Minn. 2007) (“This Court
concludes that cautionary language can not be ‘meaningful’ when defendants know that 
the potential risks they have identified have in fact already occurred, and that the positive 
statements they are making are false.”).
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the case Asher v. Baxter International Inc. is a prime such example.75 
The central issue in the case was whether Baxter’s warnings qualified as 
the “meaningful cautionary statements” required by the safe harbor 
provision, with plaintiffs contending that the “cautionary statements did 
not follow the firm’s fortunes.”76  Judge Easterbrook expressed deep 
skepticism as to the workability of the statutory language, commenting 
that “[t]he fundamental problem is that the statutory requirement of 
‘meaningful cautionary statements’ is not itself meaningful.”77  He surmised 
that in a world ideally calibrated to the needs of investors, companies
would be required to fully disclose the “assumptions and calculations”
behind their projections.78  But this is not the world in which we live, of
course. 
The PSLRA does not require the most helpful caution; it is enough [under the 
statute] to “identify[] important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking statement.”  This means that it is
enough to point to the principal contingencies that could cause actual results to
depart from that projection.79 
In light of these observations, Judge Easterbrook then concluded that 
discovery was necessary to determine whether Baxter disclosed the 
principal or important risks known at the time of the disclosure. 
Although he assuaged issuers that they need not anticipate all potential 
sources of deviations from expectations,80 this decision nevertheless 
clearly raises the bar as to what a defendant must show in order to secure
safe harbor protection; specifically, Judge Easterbrook held that where 
the risk disclosed by the defendant is not identical to the negative 
contingency that came to pass, discovery is then necessary to determine
whether the defendant disclosed the “principal risks” extant at the time
of that disclosure.81  The use of the word principal is noteworthy here 
because it indicates a more rigorous standard for evaluating the
sufficiency of cautionary language than what a plain reading of the 
statute would suggest in referring only to “important” facts.82  Indeed, at 
75. Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2004). 
76. Id. at 729–30. 
77. Id. at 729. 
78. Id. at 733. 
79. Id. at 734 (second alteration in original).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 734–35. 
82. It might also arguably contravene the legislative intent of Congress: “The
Conference Committee specifies that the cautionary statements identify ‘important’ factors to
provide guidance to issuers, and not to provide an opportunity for plaintiff counsel 
to conduct discovery on what factors were known to the issuer at the time the forward-
looking statement was made.”  H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 43–44 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
1018
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least one commentator has read the Asher decision to completely 
eviscerate the safe harbor, suggesting that plaintiffs, 
with the benefit of hindsight, will be able to allege that some “important” or
“principal” cautionary statements known to management were omitted, even if
some “important” ones were included, thereby both avoiding dismissal at the
pleading stage and achieving the opportunity to conduct the very extortionate 
discovery the PSLRA was intended to foreclose.83 
To the extent that this is true, Asher hence represents a welcomed 
move in the right direction as far as difficult-to-price securities are 
concerned.  Although it is undoubtedly an important social goal to find
ways to curtail “abusive” and “meritless” shareholder litigation,84 in this
particular context, allowing issuers to shield all forward-looking
statements from legal liability with cautionary language to the effect that 
the predicted results, as represented to investors, may differ materially 
from actual results is not the way to go.  As Judge Easterbrook astutely
suggested,85 what actual purpose do these predictions then serve—other 
than to confuse or obfuscate the true underlying risks of the financial
instrument in the minds of investors very much susceptible to the 
behavioral limitations and shortcomings highlighted in Part III.A.3? 
3.  The Behavioral Critique
In a prospectus filed with the SEC, an issuer typically does not make 
precise statements about the probability of certain outcomes being 
realized.86  Instead, the issuer discloses information that is considered 
83. See Allan Horwich, Is There a Breach in the Breakwater of the Statutory Safe 
Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements?, WALL ST. LAW., Sept. 2004, at 19 (footnote 
omitted).
84. Congress enacted the safe harbor provisions in response to perceived 
widespread abusive securities litigation that, in its view, effectively served to “muzzle”
corporate managers who were withholding useful information for “[f]ear that inaccurate 
projections will trigger the filing of securities class action lawsuits.”  Private Securities 
Reform Act of 1995, [1995–1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,710, at 
87,208 (Dec. 13, 1995). 
85. See Asher, 377 F.3d at 734–35. 
86. Safe harbor protection is not available for forward-looking statements “made
in connection with an initial public offering.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(2)(D) (2006).  Thus, 
although the spirit of this section still applies to forward-looking statements that do fall 
under the safe harbor, the discussion that follows is, technically speaking, more a critique 
of the bespeaks caution doctrine—which defendants do invoke in this context.  See, e.g.,
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4,
26–29, 40, Freidus v. ING Groep N.V., 736 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:09-
CV-01049). 
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relevant in allowing investors to make their own determination as to how
likely it is that the particular investment will or will not pay off; for 
instance, under Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K, the issuer is generally
compelled to disclose risk factors that it believes an investor would 
consider relevant and important in formulating an assessment as to the
future profitability of the given investment.87  The behavioral critique of
such disclosures, in the context of difficult-to-price financial instruments, is
that these risk factors are generally insufficiently broad to allow for such a
technical assessment, and moreover, where additional information and data
are provided, many investors—even sophistical professional investors—will 
still choose not to exert the logistical and analytical effort necessary to 
price these instruments correctly.88 
a.  Disclosed Risk Factors Are Typically Insufficiently Broad 
Consider the following disclosure filed by the Tribune Co. with the 
SEC in connection with the issue of exchangeable subordinated
debentures due in 2029, exchangeable for cash based on the value of 
87. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2010).  Item 503(c) specifies that risk factors 
should clearly state the risk and indicate how that risk specifically affects the registrant, 
namely, registrants should not present risks that could generally apply to any issuer or to
any offering.  See id.
88. By examining the specific mechanisms by which traders processed public 
information, Gilson and Kraakman concluded that four types of trading operate to affect
security prices, only one of which truly relies on the processing of a company’s public 
disclosures; in particular, although traders might value firms based on generally known news, 
such as a Federal Reserve interest rate increase—“universally informed trading”—and others
might value firms based on decoding a firm’s stock price movements—“derivatively
informed trading”—under their view, it is “professionally informed trading” that
primarily relies on the processing of a company’s public disclosures.  See Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549, 567–79 (1984).  “By searching for and processing a company’s disclosures, professional 
traders use[] a combination of long and short strategies to move a company’s price from its
‘uninformed’ price levels.”  Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A
Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis 46 (Univ. of Cal.,
Berkeley Ctr. for Law, Bus. & the Econ., Working Paper No. 1585953, 2010). The 
speed with which informational efficiency is achieved thus depends on the distribution of 
disclosed information among professional traders and, in turn, on the costs investors
face in acquiring, processing, and verifying that the information received is, in fact,
correct. Id. The authors’ responses to the various behavioral critiques set forth over the last
twenty-five years of their particular view of how markets operate have tended to focus 
on the structural limits to arbitrage. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L.
715, 733 (2003).  Although such structural limits to arbitrage are no doubt important, we 
argue that there are still good reasons to believe that even sophisticated professional 
traders—so important to informational efficiency under the Gilson-Kraakman 
view—may well be limited by the various types of cognitive deficiencies as suggested
by the behavioral finance literature. 
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AOL common stock.89  The prospectus dutifully cautions that the
following risk factors should be considered carefully before purchasing
the securities offered: that the return on the debt securities depends on 
the AOL common stock; the possible price illiquidity of the secondary
market for the offered debt security; that the number of reference shares
attributable to the debt securities will not adjust for some dilutive 
transactions involving the reference shares; the absence of covenant 
protection; the absence of a security interest in the AOL common stock; 
subordination to more senior debt; and competition with AOL.90  Arguably,
once an understanding of the debenture has been obtained upon reading 
the description of the security, these disclosed risk factors would appear
self-evident to any investor seriously contemplating purchasing this 
debt.  What is not so self-evident, however, is how an investor might use 
these disclosed risk factors to calculate a theoretical price for this 
particular exchangeable debenture, a calculation that, whatever the form,
surely requires more than the simpleminded disclosure of a rambling 
inventory of vague and somewhat obvious risk factors. 
Generally speaking, there appear to be two responses to the problem 
of forward-looking statements as they relate to the pricing of complex 
securities by investors: (1) as Judge Easterbrook suggested, require 
disclosure of all the “assumptions and calculations” underpinning the 
issuer’s projections or, better yet, the actual projected risk-reward profile
derived by the issuer of the financial instrument, assuming it exists;91 or
(2) rather than rely on a firm’s own assessment of its balance sheet or
alternatively on the credit rating assigned to it by a potentially conflicted
credit rating agency,92 require disclosure of all data and information 
relevant to the construction of risk-reward profiles and other formal risk
models.93  The first approach is unduly intrusive.  The second works
89. Tribune Co., Prospectus Supplement Pursuant to Rule 424(b)(2) (SEC
Registration No. 333-74961) (Apr. 9, 1999), http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/726513/ 
0000950131-99-002188.txt. 
90. Id. at S7–S9. 
91. Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2004). 
92. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary 
Cause of the Crisis (San Diego Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 09-015, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1430653; see also Frank 
Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for Credit 
Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999). 
93. See, e.g., Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R.
4173, 111th Cong. § 1503 (2009) (enacted) (requiring that the SEC “adopt regulations . . .
requiring each issuer of an asset-backed security to disclose, for each tranche or class of
 1021
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well with respect to easy-to-price securities; for the reasons given below, 
however, it does not work as well with respect to difficult-to-price
securities.
b.  Investors Cannot Map “Full” Disclosure onto “True” Price 
In an interesting recent paper, Bartlett demonstrates that investors in 
monoline insurers showed little evidence of using a firm’s derivative 
disclosures to efficiently resolve uncertainty arising in connection with a
monoline’s exposure to credit risk and concludes that to the extent that the
complexity of CDOs—our prototypical difficult-to-price security—impeded 
informational efficiency, it was likely due to (1) the generally low 
salience of individual CDOs and (2) the logistical challenges posed in 
processing CDO disclosures.94 
With respect to these logistical challenges, Bartlett explores, in particular, 
the flawed calculation of loss estimates for Kleros Preferred Funding VI, a 
multisector CDO originated in June 2007 by Ambac—a monoline that 
invested in a portfolio of residential MBS, CDO, and other asset-backed 
securities (ABS).95  The prospectus for Kleros VI was nearly 400 pages 
long.96  Similarly, the disclosures pertaining to each of the 534
individual CDOs in the portfolio ranged from 300 to 400 pages in
security, information regarding the assets backing that security” and requiring “issuers of 
asset-backed securities . . . to disclose asset-level or loan-level data necessary for investors to
independently perform due diligence”); COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM 151 (2009) (recommending
enhanced disclosure by structured finance vehicles to “allow investors to complete their 
own credit analysis”); FASB Staff Position No. FAS 133-1 & FIN 45-4, Disclosures
About Credit Derivatives and Certain Guarantees: An Amendment of FASB Statement 
No. 133 and FASB Interpretation No. 45 and Clarification of the Effective Date of FASB 
Statement No. 161, FIN. STANDARDS ACCOUNTING BD. (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.fasb.org/ 
jsp/FASB/Page/nr091208.shtml (requiring enhanced disclosure requirements for sellers 
of credit derivatives and financial guarantees). 
 94. Bartlett, supra note 88, at 1 (reporting that “analysis of abnormal returns to 
Ambac . . . surrounding a series of multi-notch rating downgrades of its insured CDOs reveals 
no significant stock price reactions until Ambac itself announced the effect of these 
downgrades in its quarterly earnings announcements”); see also  CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS 
& DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA: AND OTHER WAYS OUR INTUITIONS DECEIVE
US 132–37 (2010) (arguing that the more comprehensive a prospectus seems, the less 
likely it is that investors will engage in additional research or exercise independent
judgment); James J. Choi et al., Why Does the Law of One Price Fail? An Experiment on 
Index Mutual Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1405, 1405 (2010) (rejecting “hypothesis that 
subjects buy high-fee index funds because of bundled nonportfolio services” and concluding
that although search costs for fees matter, fees are not minimized, with subjects instead 
placing high weight on annualized returns since inception). 
95. “Ambac had insured $2.4 billion of the senior-most tranche of Kleros VI,” 
which was “one of Ambac’s largest CDO exposures.”  Bartlett, supra note 88, at 34. 
96. Id. at 42. 
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length.97  In Bartlett’s view, the failure of sophisticated investors to use a 
more detailed analysis of each of the CDOs’ subordination and
overcollateralization protections stems not so much from the analytical 
complexity of these provisions but from the logistical complexity of 
undertaking such an analysis; for example, time-related positioning and 
utilization of resources.  The need to economize on time in view of a 
quickly changing market, Bartlett argues, likely contributed to the
decision to avoid the delay and effort associated with locating over 500 
individual prospectuses and hand-coding each such that the relevant data 
could then be inputted into the formal pricing model.98 
In addition to these logistical challenges, Bartlett cites the low salience 
of individual CDOs as another potential reason for why highly sophisticated
arbitrageurs disregarded material information—information that they 
would have almost certainly been capable of understanding—in their 
analysis of the risks embedded in the derivative portfolio.99  Reluctant to 
implicate analytic complexity, Bartlett argues that the omission is better 
understood as simply a failure to have appreciated the exposure to the
various CDOs than as a failure to have fully grasped the underlying
contractual complexity.100  Overwhelmed by the rapid pace of news in 
early 2008, the argument is that the salience of a downgraded exposure 
could very easily have been overlooked by arbitrageurs trading in the 
market.101  Moreover, because the low salience of CDOs applies with 
equal or greater force to investors more generally, this thus suggests
a second channel by which informational efficiency may have been
impaired—specifically, in the face of compelling evidence, investors
nevertheless remain uninformed of the underlying risks, thereby
inhibiting arbitrageurs’ ability to profit from their investments in
research.102  In other words, arbitrageurs may have simply been unable
to capture the attention of a marketplace otherwise distracted and




99. Id. at 43. 
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to 
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 655 (2003) (making the point that “a bargain that 
stays a bargain is no bargain”).
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Although Bartlett’s observations are undeniably important, the present
Article departs from his analysis only insofar as we are not similarly
unwilling to view analytical complexity as impeding informational 
efficiency.  Even though this might all be semantics on some level in 
that the salience of a CDO and its analytic complexity are no doubt
intimately related given that the complicated contracts defining the 
rights and obligations under the CDO are ordinarily embedded in a
special-purpose entity whose name very often provides little indication 
of its economic size, function, or financial relevance, we do not,
however, view all sophisticated investors as being like William Ackman, 
the chief protagonist in Bartlett’s case study, who, for six years, had bet 
heavily on his ability to understand the risks associated with the
monolines’ entry into the structured finance market.103 
Understandably, Bartlett does not want to have to take the position 
that investors, such as Ackman, are simply incapable of pricing a CDO
correctly.  We do not either.  Of course they can, but just like overcoming
various logistical challenges, it requires the expenditure of costly effort. 
To the extent that investors deem this expenditure unprofitable and thus
do not exert the required effort, it is then accurate to say that they do not 
know how to price the CDO. In other words, the CDO is not well 
understood not so much because investors intrinsically lack the technical
know-how but rather because they have simply not taken the time and 
effort to use that know-how to perform the analysis required to compute 
a theoretical price for the CDO.  In our analysis, the proper baseline, 
then, is not the Ackman who has already invested such effort but rather 
Ackman six years hence.  Proceeding from this baseline, the claim, then,
is that as the analytical complexity of a given security increases, fewer
and fewer investors will choose to invest the effort required to 
analyze and fully understand the prospectuses and relevant forward-
looking statements contained therein.  In the context of difficult-to-price
securities, the number is so few—so we argue—that the markets for
these securities, which are already fairly illiquid to begin with, do not 
have the relevant mechanisms in place necessary to attain the efficient
price equilibrium point.104 
103. See Bartlett, supra note 88, at 42.  William Ackman was the founder of Pershing
Square Capital, a hedge fund that had accumulated large short positions in Ambac.  Since
2002, Ackman had been the monoline industry’s most vocal critic, publishing a number of 
reports questioning Ambac’s high credit rating.  See Alistair Barr, Pershing’s Ackman Knocks
MBIA, Ambac, WALL ST. J. MARKETWATCH, May 24, 2007, http:// www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/hedge-fund-manager-says-mbia-ambac-exposed-to-subprime-fallout. 
104. For a more detailed and perhaps more compelling articulation of a similar 
point, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 19 (2004), which argues that many legitimate transactions
resulting in the issuance of securities are “so complex that less than a critical mass of 
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B.  Getting the Incentives Right 
We now turn to what it means to say that an investment bank must 
retain the possibility of incurring “real losses” in selling difficult-to-
price financial instruments.  In theory, there appear to be two principal
mechanisms by which to achieve this objective: (1) the implementation 
of high-powered compensation schemes or (2) the adoption of
partnership-like ownership structures. Most proposals for reform have 
tended to focus on the former.105 
In our view, however, the problem with focusing on compensation is 
that these contractual arrangements essentially leave unaddressed the 
two sources of uninformed risk-taking identified above.  Although there 
do exist examples where advisers incur actual monetary losses if the
trading book is in the red, thereby addressing the house money effect— 
so-called fulcrum fees arrangements that permit investment advisers to
adjust base advisory fees depending on how the fund performs relative 
to a stipulated market index106—these fee structures are not popular in
practice.107  Moreover, for obvious reasons, it will not be easy for a
investors can understand them in a reasonable time period” and “the market will not
reach a fully informed price equilibrium, and, hence will not be efficient.”
105. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 205–06 (2004); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 287 (2010); Kose 
John et al., A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation, 13 REV. FIN.
STUD. 95, 96 (2000); see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 26–27 (2006), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf (requiring banks to provide comprehensive 
and timely information about their compensation practices and procedures).
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2) (2007). 
107. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, ‘No Excessive Pay, We’re British,’ WALL ST. J., Feb.
8, 2006, at C1 (reporting that although the average rate of increase for a CEO’s 
compensation package in the United Kingdom was around 6% in 2005, it was more than 
13% in the United States from 2003 to 2004).  Despite the difference in compensation, 
the United Kingdom’s annual return for its top 100 companies averaged 6.5%, while the 
U.S. Dow Jones Industrial Average trailed behind at 2%.  Id. There are at least two 
distinct reasons for their limited use. First, the SEC has promulgated extensive 
regulations relating to when fulcrum fees may be considered fair, which, of course, as a 
consequence, has given fund managers pause for fear that their particular compensation 
structure will be deemed “unfair” by the SEC. See generally  CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH,
INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE AND THE
LAW § 9:4.3[B], at 9–17 (2d ed. 2007) (expanding upon the factors the SEC considers to 
determine the fairness of fulcrum fees, including the fairness of the size of the fee, the
index used to determine performance for the fee, and the time period over which such 
performance is calculated).  With similar effect, the SEC has also shown a willingness to 
undertake enforcement actions calling into question the “specified period” over which
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public corporation to implement an employment compensation scheme 
whereby employees run a distinct risk of earning negative income in a 
given year.  Even if this were possible, there would still remain unaddressed 
the second source of uninformed risk-taking, namely, the earned money
effects that predictably arise where trading is conducted with funds that 
do not meaningfully constitute earned money.
1.  The Return of the Private Investment Banking Partnership 
There is an obvious solution to this problem, however—the return of the 
private investment banking partnership.  Indeed, we argue for exactly such
as the optimal means by which to properly incentivize issuers/underwriters
of difficult-to-price financial instruments to engage in nonexcessive,
suitably well-informed risk-taking behaviors.108  In many respects, the
investment banking partnership is not a terribly novel solution. Prior
to 1970, the New York Stock Exchange explicitly prohibited the 
incorporation of investment banks.109  It was only after this ban was 
repealed that the large investment banks turned, en masse and over time,
from a partnership model—where senior employees owned the company
and were responsible for all of its liabilities and received all of its 
profits—to a public ownership model.110  The argument advanced in this
the asset value of the fund under management must be averaged.  See, e.g., Dreyfus 
Corp., Investment Advisers Release No. 2549, File No. 3-12413, at 4 (Sept. 7, 2006), 
available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/ia-2549.pdf (reimbursing the fund over
$3 million after SEC alleged Dreyfus incorrectly calculated its fee by measuring it 
against its fund’s daily net asset value instead of the averaged asset value of the fund over
the thirty-six month performance period). Second, although admittedly a question of 
empirical fact, it appears that fund managers prefer no-incentive plans to symmetric 
incentive plans.  This being true, in proscribing asymmetric incentive plans without also
drawing any distinction between flat no-incentive schemes and symmetric incentive
plans, the regulation thus had the unfortunate and yet entirely predictable effect of
compelling managers to switch not to symmetric incentive plans as intended—arguably
better in terms of total investor welfare—but rather to no incentive plans—arguably
worse in terms of total investor welfare.
108. The focus on ownership structure is supported by a formal literature on hedge 
funds that has shown that risk-taking is greatly reduced if a substantial amount of the 
manager’s own money—at least 30%—is in the fund as well.  See Roy Kouwenberg & 
William T. Ziemba, Incentives and Risk-Taking in Hedge Funds, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 
3291, 3291–93, 3307 (2007); see also Laura T. Starks, Performance Incentive Fees: An
Agency Theoretic Approach, 22 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 17, 17–20 (1987). 
109. See James Surowiecki, Public Humiliation, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2008, at 
30. 
110. Joint ownership continues to be the manner by which most hedge funds are 
organized today.  See, e.g., Carl Ackermann et al., The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, 
Return, and Incentives, 54 J. FIN. 833, 833–34 (1999).  The fact that hedge fund managers
typically risk both their own money and their reputation as shrewd money managers in
running a fund is a positive sign to outside investors.  Id. at 834.  The personal involvement
of the manager, coupled with a profitable and verifiable track record, likely explains why
1026
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Part proceeds by first considering in detail how the incentives confronted 
by a proprietary trading firm differ under the two respective ownership
regimes.
a.  Proprietary Trading Within a Private Partnership 
Generally speaking, the “production function” of proprietary trading 
involves two main capital inputs: (1) access to financial capital and 
(2) human capital.111  In a partnership, the latter is bound to the firm by
the structure of partnership agreements that, in conjunction with an 
inventory of securities held by the firm, provides the basis for loans used 
to fund the firm’s broker-dealing and trading, with this inventory of 
securities, in particular, generally used as collateral by the firm to obtain 
overnight or short-term financing.112  In addition, the firm will also have
general unsecured debt obligations for which the general partners have
unlimited liability.113  As for personnel management, the firm typically 
makes “up or out” decisions for nonpartner employees four to seven
years after they have joined the firm.114  If asked to join the partnership, 
compensation tends to consist of a relatively small base salary and a 
potentially large annual performance-based bonus.115  For general and
limited partners, these bonuses do not represent pure income, however:
general partners typically have a mandatory plowback ratio of 80%, with
the ratio for limited partners somewhat lower—by this means creating a
strong incentive for these relatively asset-rich/cash-poor partners to
remain productive long after they have been admitted into the 
partnership.116 
From the perspective of agency theory, the liabilities of these firms, in 
economic terms, are (1) collateralized and unsecured debt obligations 
outside investors are so eager to invest in hedge funds, even though investors generally
receive very limited information about the hedge fund’s proprietary investment strategies 
and face significant liquidity constraints in the form of multiyear lockup periods and 
nondecreasing redemption fees. 
111. See Bruce N. Lehmann, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Management, 
91 ECON. REV., No. 4, 2006 at 81, 82. 
112. Id. at 82. 
113. Id. at 84.  The asset side of the balance sheet of the proprietary trading desk, 
VA, typically has three components: “[T]he value of the long positions (VL), cash on hand
devoted to margin requirements (CM), and uncommitted cash (CU)”; that is, more 
formally: VA = VL + CM + CU.  Id. 
114. Id. at 83. 
115. Id.
116. Id. at 84. 
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and (2) an implicit claim on human capital in the form of the general and 
limited partners.117  With respect to the latter, creditors can reasonably 
rely on these equity holders in the firm to make money over the long-
term for at least three related reasons: (1) human capital is bound to the 
firm by the plowback provisions of the partnership agreement, (2) partnership 
shares are valued at cost until sometime around retirement, further 
binding the partners to the firm, and (3) more productive partners very 
often receive higher fractional ownership through the bonus system,
“ensuring that the best traders and investment bankers serve[] on the
important committees, and, thus, closely over[see and direct most of the 
important] business activities of the firm.”118 
b.  Proprietary Trading Within a Public Corporation
Proprietary trading within a public corporation, by contrast, differs in
two significant ways119: (1) the opportunity cost of capital falls because
idiosyncratic risk is now spread out over a diversified shareholder base,120 
and (2) important agency problems now surface as a consequence of the
separation of ownership and control,121 which, because of the nature of 
proprietary trading, are qualitatively very different from those that exist
within a typical public corporation—in particular, the lack of transparency
with respect to profitability, risk, exposure, liquidity, and leverage in 
proprietary trading under the corporate form creates substantial problems
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Partnership,
Reputation, and Human Capital, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1682, 1682–83 (2004) (discussing 
the nature of human capital within the form and function of business organizations). 
119. The asset side of the balance sheet is identical to that for proprietary trading 
under private partnerships; that is, one cannot look at the trading books of, say, a convertible 
arbitrage or a short or long/short portfolio or a short-term event-driven strategy and potentially
discern the underlying governance structure. 
120. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual 
Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 329 (1983) (“Common stock allows residual risk to be 
spread across many residual claimants who individually choose the extent to which they
bear risk and who can diversify across organizations offering such claims.”).
121. See, e.g., id. at 327 (defining the term agency costs as the “costs of structuring,
monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests”); 
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 301–03 (1983).  Interestingly, Professors Berle and Means first conceived of 
the problem somewhat differently, not in terms of agency but rather in terms of the 
absence of shareholder control or power over the affairs of the corporate enterprise.
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 86–89 (1932) (making the point that the ability of shareholders to elect directors
and thereby control management was relatively meaningless in the context of the large
corporation because management controlled the proxy machinery and hence ultimately
the outcome of the election). 
1028
BUNTING POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/26/2011 11:23 AM       













   
   
 
 







     
  
 
   
[VOL. 48:  993, 2011] The Trouble with Investment Banking 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
for external monitors.122 Although compensation in the form of 
performance-based bonuses and executive stock options do mitigate 
these problems to a certain extent, without explicit external monitoring, 
these high-powered compensation schemes are likely to serve but as
imperfect substitutes for direct monitoring—especially in those times 
when good governance is needed most—where a firm is confronted with
actual or pending losses the sizes of which are capable of plunging the
entire firm into financial distress, with the ensuing feelings of helplessness 
and despair, resulting in all of the characteristic outcomes of poor 
managerial decisionmaking—“the myopic focus on short-term gains” at
the expense of long-term sustainability and the tendency “to allocate 
scarce capital resources to excessively risky,” low-probability-of-a-
large-gain-type strategies.123 
In addition, the corporate analogues of the full and limited partners 
can now be characterized as relatively cash-rich/asset-poor—in terms of
firm-specific assets—with human capital in the form of trading skill no 
longer bound to the public corporation as it was under the private 
partnership.  Indeed, under the corporate form, the human capital of 
proprietary traders is best conceived as a tangible asset that can be freely
transferred across the different firms.  As a result, notwithstanding the 
effect of high-powered compensation schemes, shareholders must primarily 
look to the franchise value—the value of the brand or the reputation of 
the investment bank—in order to properly incentivize and retain its pool
of valuable human capital.124 
2.  Two Arguments Against Structuring Investment Banks as        
Private Partnerships 
From the preceding discussion, two general, somewhat related
objections emerge as responses to the claim that investment banks
should be structured as private partnerships: (1) that unlimited liability
results in an insupportably high cost of capital, and (2) that even if steps 
are taken to minimize the costs of unlimited liability, the capital 
122. See Lehmann, supra note 111, at 84. 
123. Id. at 84–85. 
124. See Charles Fombrun & Mark Shanley, What’s in a Name? Reputation Building
and Corporate Strategy, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 233, 252 (1990); see also Richard Carter & 
Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 
1045–46, 1062 (1990); David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect 
Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253, 253, 275 (1982). 
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structure of the private partnership is still such that the cost of capital is 
sufficiently high as to preclude the possibility of investment banks, 
as presently structured, turning back to the partnership structure of 
yore.  The virtues of each of these objections are addressed in turn. 
a.  The Cost of Unlimited Liability
Under the partnership structure, the general partners, as well as those 
limited partners with control responsibilities, are exposed to unlimited
personal liability.125  The strengthening of incentives flowing from the
partnership structure, and in particular, unlimited liability, does come at
a cost, however; specifically, as compared with the public corporation, 
the principals must bear more fund-specific risk because their personal
wealth is now more strongly and positively correlated with the fortunes 
of the firm, and thus, unlike in a public corporation, the opportunity cost 
of capital or, equivalently, the required rate of return on equity will 
typically be higher because it depends on total risk, not just systemic or
market risk.126 
The increased cost of capital implied by unlimited liability can be 
easily reduced, however, if not eliminated altogether, by readily
available legal technology; in particular, under the corporate law of most 
states, partnerships can create a limited liability corporation to serve as 
the general partner, with the individual partners now serving as limited
partners.127  Although this corporate structure does effectively serve to
limit the overall liability exposure of the partnership, note that in so 
doing, it also, of course, serves to attenuate or eliminate the positive 
incentive effects associated therein. 
125. See, e.g., Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(a) (2005) (holding limited partner liable for the obligations of the 
limited partners if the partner participates in control or management of the business of
the limited partnership).
126. See Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation 
Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 133, 147 (1980); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel 
R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 94, 101 (1985). 
But see Peter Z. Grossman, The Market for Shares of Companies with Unlimited Liability: 
The Case of American Express, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 85 (1995) (rejecting the theory
that an efficient capital market with diversified shareholders cannot exist without limited
liability); Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); Mark I. Weinstein, Don’t Buy 
Shares Without It: Limited Liability Comes to American Express, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 189,
224 (2008). 
127. Indeed, Goldman Sachs, the last of the major Wall Street partnerships to go 
public, was organized in this manner well before its initial public offering in 1998.  Lehmann,
supra note 111, at 86. 
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b.  The Cost of Sticky Equity Capital 
Even if the preceding steps are taken to minimize the costs of
unlimited liability because of the illiquid nature of most equity purchases 
by—and awards to—the partners, the equity capital of a private
partnership is still likely to be relatively more sticky—and thus more
costly—than that of a general public corporation.  Again, there are steps 
that can be taken to lower these liquidity costs; for instance, the
liquidation of individual partnership interests can be made subject to a
variety of constraints: noncompete agreements, deferred payouts over a 
number of relevant fiscal periods, an aggregate limit on redemptions, 
minimum capital covenants, and net capital requirements.  In addition,
the partnership can look to noncontrolling minority interests and
founding/working partners’ capital as additional ownership interests 
available to support the assets on its balance sheet.
Nonetheless, it likely remains true that the opportunity cost of capital
implicit in the partnership form will generally be higher than that for a 
similarly situated public corporation.128 Indeed, this difference is 
perceived by many as being so large as to effectively preclude the
possibility of investment banks, as presently structured, returning to the 
partnership structure of yore.  The claim made here, however, is that this 
point is entirely misplaced insofar as it assumes a legitimate need to
maintain the current organizational structure of the modern investment 
bank.  But just what is this legitimate need?  Why cling so stubbornly to
this assumption?  The modern investment bank appears a mishmash of
financial activities, resulting in ill-informed risk-taking behaviors and 
characterized by a host of significant conflicts of interest—in which
clients seem always to find themselves on the losing end—and having a
haphazard interconnectedness that serves, often exclusively so, to 
increase overall systemic risk within the financial system.  If this ill-
conceived hodgepodge cannot be supported as a private partnership,
well, then so be it.129 
128. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 349 (1976) 
(setting forth the agency cost framework’s bedrock premise—that diversified shareholders are
cheapest cost risk bearers); cf. Morrison & Wilhelm, supra note 118, at 346–49 (setting 
forth a technological innovation theory of a partnership’s decision to go public). 
129. Along these lines, when Goldman Sachs debated going public, former senior
partner John Whitehead made the critically important point that limits on capital are not 
necessarily bad, suggesting that “[c]apital should be a restraint.  It helps you make 
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In what follows, we provide an in-depth look into how an investment
bank might respond if it were denied access to relatively low-cost
financial capital, and we catalog in detail those business lines that would 
likely continue to be offered and those that would not.  In our view, what 
thus constitutes investment banking at the end of this exercise represents
a far more sensibly organized entity than the smorgasbord of mismatched
financial enterprises into which modern investment banking has seemingly 
arbitrarily evolved over the past forty-odd years. 
i.  Investment Banking 
Without access to low-cost capital, the investment bank, organized as a
private partnership, could, of course, by definition, continue to manage and
participate in public offerings and private placements of debt—originating, 
structuring, and executing debt/debt-related financing and structuring, and
executing liability-based risk-management strategies for corporations, 
financial sponsors, and government-sponsored entities—and equity— 
originating, structuring, and executing public and private equity, equity-
linked, and derivative financing.  The investment bank could also continue 
to provide investment advisory and financial planning services to its 
corporate clients, including advice and analysis on mergers and acquisitions, 
divestitures, joint ventures, corporate restructurings, recapitalizations, 
spin-offs, exchange offers, and leveraged buyouts, as well as shareholder 
relations.130 On the other hand, there would likely be little, if any,
corporate lending, with investment banks having to reduce substantially the
extent to which they extend loans and make other lending commitments, 
including, for instance, bridge financing to select corporate clients and
full service commercial mortgage lending in the form of nonrecourse
first mortgages and mezzanine financing.
ii.  Private Wealth and Asset Management 
Despite the presence of certain inescapable conflicts of interest
strongly militating against it so doing, the investment bank could, in 
selections.  You have to make choices. We can’t do leveraged buyouts and arbitrage—or
we can do a little of each.” LISA ENDLICH, GOLDMAN SACHS: THE CULTURE OF SUCCESS 9 
(1999). 
130. To wit, as Goldman contemplated its IPO, a powerful contingent of investment
banking partners, including many in the mergers and acquisitions department that had 
generated huge profits in fees, did not sign off on this particular vision of the future 
presented by partners Stephen Friedman and Robert Rubin, namely, the expansion of
trading and principal risk. Id.  
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theory, continue to operate on the “buy-side,”131 with the bank, for
example, continuing to provide private wealth management, such as cash
management services, including cash sweeps, debit cards, electronic bill 
payments, and check writing.  It could also continue to provide lending
products, albeit presumably on a much more limited basis, including
securities-based lending, mortgage loans, and home equity lines of credit. 
The investment bank could also provide asset management, employing 
portfolio managers to run investment products ranging from money
market funds to equity taxable or tax-exempt bond funds in both developed
and emerging markets.  Similarly, institutional investors would still be
able to invest through the bank in several alternative investment
platforms, including hedge funds, funds of hedge funds, funds of private
equity funds, and portable alpha strategies.  As for merchant banking 
activities, however, the bank would very likely have to reduce substantially 
the number and scope of products offered, including, for instance, real estate
and technology principal investments, private equity funds, infrastructure 
investing groups, or other such urban and economic development initiatives. 
iii.  Sales and Trading 
The impact on sales and trading of more limited access to financial
capital is the most difficult to predict. As noted above, the investment
bank will continue to participate in equity and fixed income issuing and 
underwriting, and therefore to a certain extent, it will also continue to
engage in securities trading because investors generally expect investment 
banks to make a market in the securities that it issues/underwrites.  It 
will likely do so, however, only insofar as it can predominantly act as an
intermediary in the primary market, with the bank taking on limited
balance sheet risk; that is, the bank will likely try to confine itself to the
role of principal, who, in sales transactions, matches buyers and sellers 
with little, if any, gap between the two sides in delivery-versus-payment
settlement and who similarly, in “give up” transactions, arranges trades 
131. Recall that the exercise is only to determine what activities will decrease 
significantly or cease altogether as a result of the higher cost of capital.  Although we 
believe that investment banks should not be operating on the “buy-side” because of the 
important conflicts of interest that invariably arise in doing so—and, indeed, investors 
are increasingly demanding that banks’ brokerage services be segregated from asset
management—that argument is deferred until Part IV. 
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between third parties, with the negotiated terms executed directly
between the corresponding buyer and seller.132 
Pure proprietary trading on a large scale, however, is very unlikely to 
take place. The bank’s capital has to support a large matched book 
business.133  Although unmatched or open positions, of course, must be
held temporarily to facilitate customer flows, the trading strategies actually 
pursued by the investment bank are unlikely to be the sorts of event-
driven—merger arbitrage or the purchasing of distressed securities—or 
directional—long/short equity, global macro or CTA/managed futures— 
arbitrage strategies typically employed by proprietary traders.  Because of 
the high opportunity cost of capital, the bank will be reluctant to structure its 
various trading desks such that trading intermediation is no longer the
primary activity.134  In other words, the claim is that as capital levels
decrease relative to the size of the bank’s balance sheet as a result of 
increased proprietary trading—and leverage correspondingly increases—the 
partnership, whose own hard-earned money is now at stake, will deem such 
trading on its own account too risky an activity to be actively pursued on
a relatively sizeable scale.
Investment banks, it should be noted, will of course not particularly 
welcome their proprietary trading activities restricted in this manner.
These activities can be enormously profitable for banks.135  But simply 
because an activity is enormously profitable does not necessarily mean 
that it should be encouraged or allowed, especially where this activity is 
not essential to the functioning of an investment bank—as we 
understand that term to mean in this Article.  Indeed, a large part of why 
proprietary trading is so profitable for a bank is that it allows it to put on 
leverage vis-à-vis its own capital account.  Despite the fact that this 
leverage works to magnify the range of feasible profits for the firm,136 it
132. See Fitch Affirms Cantor Fitzgerald’s Long-Term IDR at ‘BBB’; Outlook Stable, 
BUS. WIRE, May 6, 2010, http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110506005980/en/ 
Fitch-Affirms-Cantor-Fitzgeralds-Long-Term-IDR-BBB. In terms of risk management, 
“counterparty risk”—to the extent that it exists as a result of the bank’s market-making
activities—“will likely be well-managed through client selection, netting and collateral
agreements, and [the] use of [public] exchanges.”  Id. Furthermore, it would not be surprising
to see (1) trading limits established on internal risk-ratings, anticipated estimated trading 
activity, and potential exposure to the instruments traded; (2) the client base diversified in
each of the main product segments; and (3) aggregate customer exposures closely monitored
for disproportionately large concentrations. 
133. See id. 
134. See id. 
135. For example, on average around 68% of Goldman Sachs’s revenues and profits 
in 2008 were derived from its proprietary trading desks.  See Christine Harper, Goldman 
Had More Trading-Loss Days than Morgan Stanley, Lehman, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2008), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=akv.Eg65H9DI. 
136. To see the power of leverage, consider the following example: Suppose an investor
purchases $100,000 of stock X using $50,000 margin and $50,000 cash.  The price of stock X
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can also put the firm at existential risk—a risk that is altogether
unnecessary—for in order to engage in the types of market-making
activities described above, there is no practical reason why an
investment bank needs to be so highly leveraged—other than the fact 
that it makes more money for its traders.  It does not help clients.  It is 
not necessary for the effective operation of other parts of the firm.
Given that investment banks, such as Goldman Sachs, typically pay out 
nearly half of all profits earned to their employees—as compared with
20% in a typical hedge fund—it is not even clear that it is beneficial for 
the shareholders whose very equity is being leveraged in the first place.137 
Finally, similarly unclear is the extent to which investment banks will 
continue to engage in prime brokerage and repo/securities lending. 
Although it is certainly plausible to imagine banks providing consolidated
clearance, settlement, custody, operational and administrative support, 
capital introduction, and portfolio reporting services to various institutional 
clients across multiple asset classes,138 it is less clear whether such firms
will choose to finance the investment strategies of third-party investment
entities by providing prime brokerage and repo/securities lending services. 
It will likely depend on the term structure of the financing, as well as on
the risk exposure of the collateral and counterparties involved from a 
credit perspective.  But in general, these are often highly capital-intensive
businesses that use up a significant chunk of the balance sheet.  For 
example, to the extent that its prime brokerage provides financing primarily 
through loans secured by the long positions of its hedge fund clients, the 
bank is exposed to the risk of loss if the value of the collateral held as 
security declines below the loan value and the client is unable to repay 
then increases 50%.  The investment is now worth $150,000.  If the investor cashes out at
this point, then after paying back the $50,000 originally borrowed, the investor is left 
with $100,000, of which $50,000 is profit—a 100% return even though stock X only
went up by 50%.  Leverage has allowed us to effectively double the rate of return on 
stock X.  Of course, the same can be said of potential losses. 
137. See Alan Schram, Financial Crisis Worked Out Well for Goldman Sachs, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2009, 9:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-schram/ 
financial-crisis-worked-o_b_323184.html. 
138. To the extent that private investment banking partnerships do not engage in
large-scale proprietary trading, such firms may actually have a competitive advantage as 
compared with publicly incorporated broker-dealers or commercial banks in satisfying 
the demand for these services insofar as there is less opportunity to profit from access to 
the corresponding retail flow. 
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the deficit.  Accordingly, like proprietary trading, prime brokerage may 
very well be considered too risky to be pursued on a large scale.139 
In short, recall that the import of all of this is to provide some sort of 
comprehensive response to the claim that the higher cost of capital
implied by the partnership form will preclude the modern investment
bank from operating as presently structured.  As the preceding discussion 
illustrates, we fully agree—but only insofar as the claim relates to
investment banks as presently structured, for we then ask the question,
Is this particular structure really the most sensible?  Is it really to be 
preferred to the perfectly viable structure outlined above that, in our 
view, likely emerges where an investment bank is compelled to organize
itself as a private partnership?  As the following discussion will hopefully
continue to make clear, we think not.
3.  Two Arguments for Structuring Investment Banks as        
Private Partnerships 
In addition to better addressing the agency problems that stem from 
the separation of ownership and control, there are two additional
arguments that can be made to support the claim that investment banks 
should be structured as private partnerships: organizing as such (1) reduces 
systemic risk in the financial system and (2) weakens the conflicts of
interest inherent wherever a financial firm simultaneously pursues both 
sales and trading of securities.
a.  Reducing Systemic Risk in the Financial System 
One question that might conceivably arise from all of this is, Are we
advocating a position that has as one of its consequences an investment
banking sector that is dangerously exposed to market risk insofar as
firms now lack the capital necessary to pursue expansion along a number
of different business lines?  All else equal, this may be true; but all else
is not equal.  With expansion tends to come greater credit and liquidity
risk.140  Moreover, as the total risk borne by investment banks increases,
on net, the number of firms operating within the appropriately defined 
market correspondingly likely decreases, and as the size of these firms 
increases and the total number of competitors decreases, the financial
system, more generally, is now forced to address important “too big to 
139. In our view, prime brokerage and securities lending programs are better left to
traditional commercial banks or publicly incorporated broker-dealers. 
140. See  GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF
BANK BAILOUT 64–65 (2004) (arguing that “after becoming larger, banks ‘spend’ their
diversification benefit by taking on additional risk”). 
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fail” type issues,141 with the relevant empirical evidence providing little
support for the proposition that large banks enjoy significant economies 
of scale—above what is actually a very low size threshold.142  In other  
words, to the extent that the adoption of the partnership structure results 
in a greater number of smaller firms, that is, lower market concentration, 
it contributes to the reduction of systemic risk in the financial system,
and it does so without incurring the cost of expansive systematic scale 
inefficiencies. 
As a result, the proposed framework thus implements, albeit indirectly, 
one of the policy proposals included within the Volcker Rule as outlined 
above, namely, that a financial firm not be allowed to acquire another 
company if the resulting firm would incur more than 10% of the 
liabilities of the financial system.143  Notwithstanding the obvious
difficulties involved in providing some kind of substantive meaning to 
the phrase liabilities of the financial system, note that it remains to be 
explained why ten is the right number and not, say, five or fifteen. 
Rather than attempt to defend what might be justifiably criticized as an
arbitrarily chosen threshold, however, a generally similar result obtains 
not through narrow legislative bright-line rules but rather by
encouraging the adoption of a particular ownership structure; that is, a 
more palatable market concentration in terms of overall financial
stability can be achieved not as the narrowly defined objective of a 
 141. The phrase too big to fail corresponds to the notion in financial regulation that 
the largest and most interconnected businesses are so large and so big that a government 
cannot allow them to declare bankruptcy because such failure would have a debilitating
effect on the overall economy. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE 
WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 208 (2010) (arguing 
forcefully that the solution to the “too big to fail” problem is obvious: “do not allow 
financial institutions to be too big to fail; break up the ones that are”).
142. A review of multiple empirical studies found that economies of scale vanish at 
some point above $10 billion in assets. See Dean Amel et al., Consolidation and Efficiency in
the Financial Sector: A Review of the International Evidence, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 
2493, 2500 (2004); see also Stephen A. Rhoades, A Summary of Merger Performance 
Studies in Banking, 1980–93, and an Assessment of the “Operating Performance” and 
“Event Study” Methodology, 167 BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. 7 (1994), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/1990-99/ss167.pdf (explaining that 
operating performance and event studies result in an overall conclusion that bank
mergers do not generally tend to result in efficiency gains); Allen N. Berger & David B. 
Humphrey, Bank Scale Economies, Mergers, Concentration, and Efficiency: The U.S.
Experience (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper 94-24, 1994), available at fic.wharton.
upenn.edu/fic/papers/94/9425.pdf (discussing that scale economies in banking are
not found to be materially important, except for the smallest banks). 
143. Volcker Rule, supra note 4, § 13a. 
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particular piece of legislation but rather as the byproduct of a more
expansive regulatory framework involving the appropriate ownership
structure for investment banks suitably defined. 
Further contributing to overall financial stability, it follows that 
investment banks structured as partnerships will be less susceptible to 
the sorts of dramatic runs on the bank—which led, for example, to the 
demise of the venerable investment banking firm Bear Stearns in the 
spring of 2008144—for at least two reasons: (1) more liquid balance 
sheets and (2) immunity from the pressures of frenzied short-selling.
First, the partnership structure should result in a more liquid balance 
sheet.  On the asset side of the balance sheet, for the reasons discussed
above, investment banks should be much less willing to invest in long-
term illiquid assets.  To the extent that they do so, they should be much
more serious about hedging the consequent risks over the long-term; for 
example, instead of bearing the credit risk themselves, they should work 
with financial insurance companies to structure credit default swaps that
allow the credit risk to be transferred off of their balance sheets and onto 
the balance sheets of firms better able to bear such risk, namely,
insurance companies.  Similarly, on the liability side, in financing the 
balance sheet, not only should investment banks be less willing to rely 
on short-term financing—which is dangerously susceptible to margin 
calls and nonrenewals without notice145—but also the liabilities that are
incurred will very likely be less liquid as banks choose to decrease, or no 
longer hold, “demand deposits” in the form of cash balances of asset
management and private wealth clients and move to decrease, or stop 
entirely, the practice of rehypothecating the securities, pledged by these 
clients, so as to further leverage the balance sheet.
Second, because the shares of a private investment bank partnership
will not be publicly traded, the bank will be shielded from the pressures 
of frenzied short-selling.  Although it is readily accepted that short-
selling, in principle, plays a critically important role in any well-functioning 
capital market, often applying much-needed downward pressure on 
security prices that have become overvalued, it must be similarly 
admitted that it can also serve to ignite and spread a dangerous and
infectious panic among those who daily participate in these markets.146 
144. See WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED
EXCESS ON WALL STREET 17–25, 42–53, 69–74, 244–54 (2009). 
145. See generally Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit 
Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77 (2009). 
146. For example, Citigroup Inc. CEO Vikram Pandit several times suggested to the 
Congressional Oversight Panel overseeing the funds from the government bailouts that 
short-sellers were partially to blame for the bank’s near collapse in the fall of 2008.  See 
Tom Braithwaite & Alan Rappeport, Pandit Blames Citi’s Woes on Short Selling, FIN.
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That is, assuming that information cascades exist, that investors “rationally 
herd,”147 and that prices can and do overshoot and undershoot their true
value—contrary to the precepts of the efficient market hypothesis— 
especially in periods of high market volatility, short-selling “can, in 
theory, drive a company’s stock price well below fundamental value” and
hold it there for a nontrivial amount of time.148  This is particularly true
for financial institutions, whose stock price is intimately related to the
underlying business.  For these financial institutions, highly concentrated
short-selling is capable of materially disrupting the ordinary course of 
business by inspiring fear and doubt among a variety of different market
actors, including depositors, investors, lenders, and other assorted
counterparties.149  To the extent that this results in greater systemic risk 
within the financial system, the partnership structure hence reduces such
risk by affording investment banks a surely much-appreciated refuge 
from the assails of these disruptive, and potentially destabilizing, market
forces.150 
b.  Better Balancing the Conflict of Interest that “Sales and      
Trading” Suggests on Its Face 
Perhaps the strongest argument, however, in favor of the partnership 
structure is that it appears to strike exactly the right balance in resolving 
the conflict of interest that invariably arises between proprietary trading 
and sales.  Although it is widely recognized that the modern investment 
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2f988dc0-2796-11df-
b0f1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1UiE0iHYX. 
147. See generally Mark Grinblatt et al., Momentum Investment Strategies, Portfolio 
Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1088 
(1995); John R. Nofsinger & Richard W. Sias, Herding and Feedback Trading by 
Institutional and Individual Investors, 54 J. FIN. 2263 (1999); Brett Trueman, Analyst 
Forecasts and Herding Behavior, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 97 (1994); Russ Wermers, Mutual 
Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices, 54 J. FIN. 581 (1999). 
148. See James Surowiecki, The Short-Selling Question, NEW YORKER, Nov. 24, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/jamessurowiecki/2008/11/the-shortsellin.html. 
149. Id. (“[T]he declining stock price wasn’t simply an epiphenomenon of the
problems with Citigroup’s business: the declining stock price actually exacerbated those
problems.”). 
150. It is true the funds could still experience runs in the form of margin calls and
redemption requests.  The argument is not that the private partnership structure precludes 
entirely the possibility of a liquidity crisis but rather is that it eliminates an important 
signal often serving to ignite what are often irrational-seeming losses in confidence in
the solvency of the firm’s balance sheet.
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bank is riddled with significant conflicts of interest151—suggestive, 
perhaps, of the unnaturalness of this particular corporate form—including 
(1) corporate issuance versus research,152 (2) sales/trading versus
research,153 (3) asset management versus brokerage,154 and (4) proprietary 
trading versus nonproprietary trading, including “front running” and 
trading as principal against an uninformed retail flow,155 the specific
conflict of interest at issue here—which has been relatively 
underemphasized in the academic literature on investment banking—is 
the conflict of interest that arises where an investment bank issues/
underwrites securities, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, trades in
these very same securities for its own proprietary account.  In other 
words, we assert that this combination of activities, which investment
banks proudly describe as one of their core functions, namely, sales and 
trading, suggests, on its face, an intrinsic conflict of interest that if not to 
151. See, e.g., Erik Sirri, Investment Banks, Scope, and Unavoidable Conflicts of
Interest, 2004 ECON. REV., no. 4, 2006 at 23, 26, available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/ 
filelegacydocs/erq404_sirri.pdf (“What is clear is that the scope economies that arise
from housing the customary business lines of investment banks under one roof lead to 
clear conflicts of interest.”). 
152. See, e.g., Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the 
Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653, 653 
(1999) (concluding that the recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant 
evidence of bias that the market does not fully recognize and positing on this basis a
potential conflict of interest inherent in the different functions that investment bankers 
perform); Kent L. Womack, Do Brokerage Analysts’ Recommendations Have Investment
Value?, 51 J. FIN. 137, 139 (1996) (showing that the new buy and sell recommendations 
of stocks by security analysts at major U.S. brokerages display significant, systematic 
discrepancies between prerecommendation prices and eventual values); cf. Jonathan
Clarke et al., Are Analyst Recommendations Biased? Evidence from Corporate Bankruptcies, 
41 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 169, 172–73 (2006) (failing to find overoptimism 
in analyst recommendations, including those of affiliated analysts, and concluding that
recently passed legislation to reduce analysts’ conflicts of interest might be an overreaction). 
 153. Sirri, supra note 151, at 29.  The analyst might favor some investors over others in
choosing how to disseminate the research; for example, if the research information arose 
because of some corporate finance performed by the analyst, the analyst might be 
tempted to pass that information along to a favored trading client. Id. The analyst could 
also allow the information to be used internally at the bank’s proprietary trading desk, 
with the bank establishing a large principal position based on this inside information. Id. 
154. To the extent that a portfolio adviser is permitted to use client brokerage
commissions on behalf of its clients, the adviser might try to obtain products or
services—most notably, research—from a broker-dealer in exchange for the direction of
client-brokerage transactions to that same broker-dealer, creating a potential conflict of
interest insofar as a portfolio adviser could then use the commissions to acquire goods, 
services, or both, which benefits itself rather than the funds under management. 
155. Front-running is the illegal practice of a broker’s executing orders on a security
for its own account in advance of filling orders previously submitted by its customers in 
an attempt to benefit from the resulting changes in prices affected by the customer 
orders. 
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be proscribed outright surely warrants far greater regulatory scrutiny
than is presently the case.156 
Although it is, of course, possible to address this problem by simply
banning self-dealing transactions between a bank’s sales desks and its
trading desks, this will very likely entail substantial monitoring costs as 
regulators strive vainly to police the behavior of those who are under 
very real pressures not just to make a market but to make a market
unduly stacked in their favor.  On the other hand, the problem could be 
resolved by simply proscribing proprietary trading by a bank in
securities issued/underwritten by that same bank.  But this ignores the 
important fact that investors generally expect an investment bank to 
make a market in the securities that it issues/underwrites.  Where to 
draw the line then?  How much proprietary trading is too much?  The 
private partnership provides an answer in pulling off—perhaps uniquely
so—what is, in our view, the very difficult balancing act of finding just 
the right subtle compromise between engaging in market-making activities, 
on the one hand, but also, on the other hand, not allowing these activities 
to become such a significant part of the business that the temptation to 
subjugate the client’s best interests to those of the firm’s proprietary
account becomes simply too great to be ignored.
To amplify this delicate balancing act, recall the distinction between 
selling in a primary market versus selling in a secondary market—a 
distinction that, of course, is embodied in the very structure of the
original security regulation statutes.  In a primary market, issuers sell 
securities that they have designed and structured—often with the help of 
a consortium of underwriters—to a variety of different investor-clients. 
The conceptual move we advocate for is that the investor-clients
involved in these primary sale transactions involving difficult-to-price 
financial securities be deemed clients to whom some kind of fiduciary 
duty or obligation is owed—a duty, so we argue, that must not be diluted 
or attenuated by conflicting fiduciary duties and obligations owed to 
public shareholders.157 
156. See, e.g., Sales and Trading, MORGAN STANLEY, http://www.morganstanley.
com/institutional/sales/index.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2011) (listing sales and trading as one
of its primary institutional services).
157. Interestingly, this very idea was the subject of a highly charged debate in the 
critical first years after the Exchange Act was passed.  See, e.g., John T. Flynn, Other
People’s Money: Contradictory Recommendations of the SEC—Are Brokers and Traders 
To Be Separated? Let the SEC Protect the Public, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 8, 1936, at 253,
253.  An early draft of the Exchange Act would have prohibited a broker from acting as a 
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In particular, where an issuer/underwriter of securities operates within 
a public corporation, the issuer/underwriter must balance the interests of 
clients with the various fiduciary duties owed to the shareholders of the
corporation.158 To the extent that compensation is linked to share price
or to the value of the trading book or to some combination of both, the 
investment banker, working as a shareholder-employee within a publicly
traded investment bank, is thus additionally tempted to evaluate any
given decision not in terms of the best interests of the client-customer to
whom the banker does not owe a fiduciary duty but rather in terms of its 
impact upon the trading book or upon the stock price of the firm more 
generally.  Indeed, albeit purely anecdotal, evidence of such bias can be
routinely confirmed in casual discussions with those who are working, 
or who have worked, in the securities-selling industry.159 
The story of Goldman Sachs v. SEC is instructive in this regard.160 
The case centers on allegedly materially misleading statements and 
omissions made in connection with a synthetic CDO Goldman Sachs
structured and marketed to investors.  This synthetic CDO, known as 
ABACUS, was tied to the performance of subprime MBS.  Goldman 
Sachs’s marketing materials represented that the reference portfolio was
selected by an independent “collateral manager,” ACA.  “Undisclosed in 
the marketing materials, [however,] and unbeknownst to investors, a 
large hedge fund, Paulson & Co. (Paulson), with economic interests
directly adverse to investors in ABACUS[], played a significant role in 
the portfolio selection process.”161  Indeed, “after participating in the
selection of the reference portfolio, Paulson effectively shorted the 
dealer or underwriter—the rationale taking into account the inherent conflicts of interest
present where persons acting as agents for their customers enter the market and trade on
their own behalf.  See National Securities Exchange Act of 1934, H.R. 7852, 73d Cong. 
§ 10 (1934); National Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S. 2693, 73d Cong. § 10 (1934). 
158. See generally ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986) (describing at 
length the duties of officers and directors). 
159. See generally  MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE
ON WALL STREET (1989).  Lewis suggests that the culture of Salomon Brothers was one 
in which customers consistently took a back seat to the firm’s own trading book.  See id.
at 208.  When Lewis, for example, had unknowingly relieved a losing long position on
Salomon’s own trading book to the detriment of a small institutional client, he wrote that 
the best thing for him to do was to “pretend . . . that [he] had meant to screw the customer. 
People would respect that.  That was called jamming.”  Id. at 208 (emphasis added).  In
response to the question of how this systematic practice of harming the customer did not 
lead to financial ruin, Lewis offered up as an answer the following comment by the head
of the corporate bond desk at the time, Tom Strauss, unbelievably made while at a lunch
with a customer: “Customers have very short memories.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Jamming a client is now called “ripping his face off.” See FRANK PARTNOY, 
F.I.A.S.C.O.: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET TRADER 61 (1999). 
160. See generally Complaint, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 1:10-cv-03229, 
2011 WL 2305988 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2011), 2010 WL 1508202. 
161. Id. at 2. 
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[]MBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps” 
with Goldman to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS 
capital structure.162 
Given its short position, Paulson had an economic incentive to choose 
a list of MBS that it expected to experience credit events in the near
term.163  Goldman Sachs did not disclose Paulson’s adverse economic
interests or its role in the portfolio selection process.164  In other words,
Goldman arranged a transaction at Paulson’s request in which Paulson
heavily influenced the selection of the portfolio to suit its economic 
interests but failed to disclose to investors Paulson’s role in the portfolio 
selection process or its plainly adverse economic interests more
generally.165  On the contrary, Goldman misled ACA into believing that
Paulson had invested approximately $200 million in the equity tranche 
of ABACUS.166  Less than one year later, 99% of the portfolio had been
downgraded,167 with investors losing over $1 billion in total.  Paulson’s
opposite CDS positions, on the other hand, netted a profit of close to 
$1 billion. 
The facts could have been worse for Goldman Sachs.  To be fair, it
was Paulson, and not Goldman, that directly profited on the short 
position, though Goldman presumably earned its fair share in fees; 
indeed, Goldman claims to have lost roughly $100 million on the
trade.168  But regardless of the precise economics of the ABACUS 





166. The “equity tranche” exists at the bottom of the CDO structure.  In particular, 
it is the first layer to experience losses when the performance of the MBS portfolio that 
comprises the CDO deteriorates.  Investors in the equity tranche therefore have a strong 
economic incentive to see the reference MBS portfolio succeed.  Id. at 13. 
167. Somewhat damningly, perhaps, the credit ratings of the Class A-D tranches of 
ABACUS ranged from A2/A to Aaa/AAA, respectively, where note that a four-year 
idealized default probability—assuming 50% average expected loss-given-default—for 
the lowest A2 rating would be calculated by Moody’s as approximately equal to 0.3796%.
See ARTURO CIFUENTES, MOODY’S INVESTOR’S SERV., THE BINOMIAL EXPANSION
METHOD APPLIED TO CBO/CLO ANALYSIS 2–4 (1996), available at http://www.statebrand.
ru/upload/files/lib_1223663480.pdf; GOLDMAN SACHS, ABACUS 2007-AC1: $2 BILLION
SYNTHETIC CDO REFERENCING A STATIC RMBS PORTFOLIO 14 (2007), available at http://
blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/files/2010/04/30036962-Abacus-2007-Ac1-Flipbook-200
70226.pdf. 
168. See Louise Story, Bank Says Losses Prove No Ill Intent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
2010, at B1. 
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not so much from the fact that a Goldman Sachs is at the same time
betting against a mortgage-linked CDO that it has sold to its investor-
clients per se but rather because a Goldman Sachs has assumed a short
position with respect to a product that it has sold to investors not in its 
capacity as a broker-dealer operating in a secondary market but rather in 
its capacity as an issuer/underwriter operating in a primary market.169 
That is, in ways that broker-dealers just simply do not, issuers/underwriters 
of difficult-to-price securities owe a special fiduciary-like duty to the
general investing public.170 
They must.  For as the facts of Goldman Sachs aptly illustrate, the 
temptation for mischief is just too great otherwise.  It is just too easy to 
imagine how banks might profit from selling to investor-clients difficult-
to-price securities that are from the very start—as was the ABACUS
CDO, perhaps—“structured to fail” or “intended to fail.”171  This  
conflict of interest between shareholder and client, between what is best 
for the firm’s proprietary account, on the one hand, and what is best for 
the client’s nonproprietary account, on the other, is entirely
unacceptable.  The duty or obligation to act in the client’s best interest 
must not be subjugated to management, the board of directors, or the 
shareholders more generally.172  In transacting with an investment bank,
169. Technically speaking, the issuer was ABACUS 2007-AC1, Ltd., incorporated 
with limited liability in the Cayman Islands, the co-issuer was ABACUS 2007-AC1, 
Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, and the initial 
purchaser/underwriter was Goldman, Sachs & Co. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 167, at
19.  These legalistic distinctions are not meaningful, in our view, as to whether Goldman 
can be properly conceptualized as the issuer/underwriter of ABACUS. 
170. A similar question was addressed in a recent decision in the Federal Court
of Australia.  See ASIC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Austl. Pty. Ltd. (No. 4) (2007) 160
FCR 35 (Austl.).  The private side of Citigroup acted for Toll Group on a proposed
takeover of Patrick Corporation, while at the same time, the public side of
Citigroup—proprietary traders—purchased a significant parcel of shares in Patrick.
Id. at 43. The argument advanced by Australia’s financial services regulator, ASIC, was that 
proprietary trading in the target company’s shares in the lead up to the takeover—by a
division of the bank separate from the advisory team—placed the bank in a situation
where its personal interests conflicted with its duty to the bidder-client, in breach of a
fiduciary duty owed by the bank to that client. Id.  Interestingly, Judge Jacobson concluded 
that “[b]ut for the express terms of the mandate letter, the pre-contract dealings 
between Citigroup and Toll would have pointed strongly toward the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship in Citigroup’s role as an adviser,” noting that “[v]ulnerability of the 
client is one of the indicia of the fiduciary relationship,” where that vulnerability should 
be judged not by reference to the sophistication of the client but rather with regards to
the “special opportunity of the adviser to abuse the expectation of loyalty.” Id. at 78, 83. 
171. The idea here is that an entrepreneur typically does not seek to raise significant 
amounts of capital in order to start a company only so that the entrepreneur might make
corresponding bets that the company will fail.  Whether an issuer/underwriter might structure
and market a CDO for that sole purpose, however, is an entirely different matter.
172. Along exactly these lines, ASIC alleged that Citigroup’s proprietary trading 
gave rise to five separate conflicts of interest.  ASIC, 160 FCR at 87–92.  The first three
1044
BUNTING POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/26/2011 11:23 AM       
















     









[VOL. 48:  993, 2011] The Trouble with Investment Banking 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
an investor must not be asked to determine whether the principal benefits of
a particular financial product—a product that they do not altogether 
understand by assumption—inure to them or to the shareholders or to the 
twenty-something-year-old sitting essentially unsupervised at a fixed 
income proprietary trading desk. 
This claim that proprietary trading on the contributed equity capital of 
public shareholders is wholly incompatible with the sale of difficult-to-
price securities on the primary market flows from the recognition that 
primary markets are of primary importance.  It is the point at which 
these financial instruments capable of causing such sweeping havoc for 
society more broadly first enter the financial system, and as a result, 
these gates need to be watched very carefully—and for the last eighty
years, they have, at least in the case of easy-to-price securities, such as 
equities or U.S. Treasuries.  But where securities are sold that cannot be
accurately priced because the relevant markets are illiquid and because 
the technical and logistical complexities far exceed whatever could have 
possibly been imagined by the original drafters of the securities laws, the 
disclosure model, as evidenced by recent events, has proven far less
successful.173  In effect, investors have been left to purchase securities at 
their own peril, with disclosure no longer serving the purpose of caveat 
allegations rested upon the argument that as a fiduciary Citigroup had a positive duty to 
disclose to Toll all information in its possession that might be relevant to the relationship
and the advice provided under it.  Id. at 88–90.  Judge Jacobson rejected—implicitly, if
not explicitly—the existence of such a duty.  Id.  As for the fourth claim, ASIC alleged 
that it was in Toll’s best interest that the price of Patrick shares not increase because this 
would lead to an erosion of the apparent premium being offered by Toll over the prebid 
market price of Patrick shares, where Citigroup’s proprietary trading had a contrary long
position in Patrick shares.  Id. at 90–92.  Jacobson rejected the claim on a factual level, 
concluding that ASIC failed to establish that Toll had the interest alleged—even though
all sorts of other reasons exist why Toll would not want the price of Patrick shares to increase; 
for example, it may increase the likelihood that the bid is rejected or later challenged on 
legal grounds as unfair.  Id. at 91.  Finally, with respect to members of Citigroup’s senior
management and compliance teams who had become aware of its substantial proprietary
shareholding, Judge Jacobson again found no conflict because, in his view, there was no
evidence to support the allegation that there was a risk that the views of senior
management on the bid price would be sought by Toll, even though it does seem hard to
believe that at the time there really was no risk at all that Toll would contact senior
management or compliance teams in connection with what was an ostensibly significant 
business matter. Id. at 92. 
173. The following crises are examples of this: the 1989 S&L crisis, the 1994 bond
market crisis, the 1995 Mexican debt crisis, the 1996–1997 Asian crisis, the 1998 Russian 
collapse and the long-term capital management debacle, the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis,
the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis, and potentially the 2012 corporate debt crisis. 
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venditor because investors no longer understand the full import of the 
disclosures being made.  Moreover, hopelessly conflicted banks have 
been able to rationalize selling to clients investment strategies that they
know or strongly suspect are fundamentally flawed by claiming that 
their clients knew full well what they were getting themselves into, that 
on the basis of the public disclosures made, these clients voluntarily 
chose to purchase the offered securities having arrived—for whatever
reasons—at very different conclusions than the banks did as to their 
prospective long-term profitability.
And so, where the disclosure model is not working, other measures 
and steps must be taken.  It is not enough to blandly blame investors for 
failing to understand public disclosures of complex-structured financial 
products for which there is no active market; indeed, to do so is to
effectively transform the operative standard from caveat venditor back to
caveat emptor—the very standard that the original securities statutes 
sought to eliminate and replace.174  No, the focus must turn to the “sell 
side” and, in particular, to implementing modifications to the existing
market structure that more forcefully incentivize issuers/underwriters to
fully understand the products that they are selling to investors on the 
primary market and to better value them accordingly, both in terms of
ask prices and mark-to-model valuations to the extent that these assets
are required to remain on their balance sheets.  The proposal set forth 
represents a humble, tentative step in that direction. 
C.  The Regulatory Carrot 
It is important to understand that our proposal does not envision an
absolute bar on public ownership of investment banks.  If an investment 
bank wishes to structure itself as such, then of course it should be 
perfectly free to do so.  But given this, the real problem in implementing
the proposed framework then lies with the competition for individual 
talent arising from those firms that choose to publicly incorporate and
from competitors flush with low-cost capital—and less burdened by the 
174. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)
(“A fundamental purpose [common to the security laws was] to substitute a philosophy
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard 
of business ethics in the securities industry.” (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963))); see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (“Let 
the seller also beware.”), quoted in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).  It was 
premised on the theory that complete and timely availability of information would result
in efficient, well-functioning capital markets. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir. 1973 ) (holding that “[t]he securities laws seek
to prevent restrictions” on flows of information and funds that would “distort the
market’s estimate of value”).
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nuisance of long-term thinking—that are in a prime position to lure 
away productive partners with enticements of substantial salary and 
signing bonuses.  In other words, in terms of the two main capital inputs 
identified above, it is not the higher cost of capital that presents a
problem—as is typically suggested—so much as it is the retention of
human capital and in particular the deterioration of the binding of human
capital to the firm, via plowback provisions and book value accounting, 
which takes place where lucrative outside offers are outstanding.175 
In Part III.C.1–2, we provide a brief sketch of a proposed regulatory 
framework that is designed to give those willing to structure themselves 
as private partnerships a chance to compete in the highly competitive 
marketplace for the human capital of investment professionals.
In particular, we isolate two principal regulatory tools that may be
employed to entice investment banks to voluntarily arrange themselves 
as private partnerships: (1) mandatory periodic disclosures and (2) the 
imposition of fiduciary duties and obligations owed to investors.176 
1.  Varying Mandatory Periodic Disclosures 
The strategies employed by proprietary traders are very often valuable, 
highly confidential trade secrets.  This fact alone makes disclosure more
burdensome than would typically be the case for the general public 
corporation. By suitably ramping up the scope and breadth of disclosure 
requirements for public corporations relative to private partnerships, the
latter form obviously becomes more attractive accordingly—especially
for those trading firms at the very forefront of financial innovation.
175. “Even Goldman Sachs, which had a long-standing policy of not making lateral 
hires from other firms, began to do so in 1990 to stem the outflow of human capital even 
while it remained a private partnership.”  Lehmann, supra note 111, at 84. 
176. There is a third potential regulatory tool: risk controls in the form of restrictions on
position sizes, short sales, and leverage.  The focus of the present Article is SEC rulemaking. 
We do not feel that this type of regulatory action is well suited for the SEC. See, e.g., 
Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
200 & 240) (resulting in all five major investment banks’ increasing their overall 
leverage in taking on ever larger and more risky positions).  The disastrous consequences
of this particular excursion into setting net capital requirements for various financial entities
was, in part, to be sure, a matter of regulatory will, but it was also, in larger part, we believe, a
matter of regulatory competence. What institutional entity should then properly take hold of
these regulatory reins becomes a very interesting question, but one unfortunately
that also takes us beyond the scope of the present Article. 
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Moreover, because proprietary trading firms routinely use short sales 
and leverage and their assets are typically illiquid, mark-to-market
accounting presents a host of significant problems for firms engaged in
proprietary trading.177  To wit, on September 30, 2008, the SEC and the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a joint clarification 
regarding the implementation of fair-value accounting rules in cases
where a market is disorderly or inactive.178  This guidance clarified that 
forced liquidations are not indicative of fair value because this is not an
“orderly” transaction as that term is used in Financial Accounting 
Standard (FAS) 157.179  Furthermore, it clarified that estimates of fair 
value can be made using the expected cash flows from such instruments,
provided that the estimates reflect adjustments that a potential buyer 
would willingly make, such as adjustments for default, liquidity, and 
interest rate risks.180  These rules would of course continue to apply to 
177. Former Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chair William Isaac, for example,
placed much of the blame for the subprime mortgage crisis on the SEC and its fair value 
rules, especially the requirement that banks mark their assets to market, particularly with 
respect to MBS.  See Brooke Sopelsa, Former FDIC Chair Blames SEC for Credit Crunch, 
CNBC (Oct. 9, 2008, 12:49 PM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/id/27100454/Former_FDIC-
Chair_Blames_SEC_for_Credit_Crunch. The intent of a mark-to-market accounting
standard is to help investors understand the value of these assets at any given point in
time rather than just their historical purchase price.  Where the market for these assets is
distressed, however, it is difficult to sell at prices that reflect the value of the mortgage
cash flows.  As initially interpreted by companies and their auditors, the lower actual sale
value, and not the higher implied cash flow value, was used as the market value, causing
many large financial institutions to recognize significant losses during 2007 and 2008, 
triggering margin calls, and often resulting in further forced sales and emergency efforts 
to obtain cash to pay off the next set of margin calls.  Markdowns also reduced the 
value of bank regulatory capital, requiring additional capital raising efforts and creating 
uncertainty as to the overall health and long-term sustainability of the bank.  If cash
flow-derived value—which excludes market judgments as to default risk but may also
more accurately reflect actual value if the market is sufficiently distressed—had 
been used, the size of these problematic market value adjustments under the accounting 
standard would have been significantly reduced. But see Floyd Norris, Problem for Bankers? 
The Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at B1 (arguing angrily that blaming the accounting 
rules is akin to saying, “If only the banks could pretend the assets were valuable, then the 
system would be safe”). 
178. See Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n & Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 
Staff, Clarifications on Fair Value Accounting (Sept. 30, 2008) (on file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission), available at http://www.iasplus.com/usa/sec/0809fairvalue.pdf; see
also Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 132 (2008) 
(restating the SEC’s authority to suspend application of FAS 157 if the SEC determines 
it is in the public’s interest and protects investors). 
179. See  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS NO. 157: FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS 7 (2008) [hereinafter FAS 157], available 
at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs &blobkey=
id&blobwhere=1175820931833&blobheader=application%2Fpdf. 
180. See id. at 21.  On April 9, 2009, FASB did finally issue its official update to 
FAS 157, easing the mark-to-market accounting rules that apply where the market is 
unsteady or inactive. See Status of FASB Staff Position 157-4, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
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private partnerships, but again, so as to level the playing field, the idea is
that they would not apply, or apply with lesser force, to public
corporations, where we should recall that the theoretical motivation for 
doing so is that these firms are less capable of independently generating 
accurate valuations of difficult-to-price securities and therefore are more 
in need of the harsh discipline of unfettered capital markets.
Finally, proprietary trading strategies are often so dynamic that
regulatory snapshots, such as quarterly 10-Q reports, paint an unreliable 
picture of recent history in terms of the relevant risk, return, and 
leverage characteristics of the firm.  Long positions can very quickly
become short positions, and leverage often changes by an order of
magnitude so fast that the true value of periodic reporting becomes a bit 
unclear.181  Understanding that disclosure in this context will always be
ineffectual to a certain extent, the frequency of such disclosures by
publicly listed companies can nevertheless be increased so as to raise the 
relative expense of incorporation, where it is not so much the increase in
terms of the actual costs of making such disclosures—application fees 
and legal expenses—that is important as it is the increase in exposure to
legal liability for fraudulent statements made in connection with these now
more frequently filed, government-mandated disclosures—disclosures that
are backed by the possibility of criminal sanctions and often highly
publicized SEC enforcement.182 
The argument that will predictably be made against increasing the 
disclosure obligations of a public corporation as proposed is that the 
underlying economics of proprietary trading is such that the added
regulatory burden will likely push proprietary traders into other 
organizational forms that are less economically efficient or into foreign
jurisdictions that are less mindful of the need for securities regulation in 
general.  Although the overall impact of interjurisdictional competition 
BD. (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Pronouncement_C&pagename 
=FASB%2FPronouncement_C%2FStatusPage&cid=1176154735524. 
181. See  COHAN, supra note 144, at 75 (reporting that at the end, Bear Stearns’s 
leverage ratio was 50:1 during the quarter, with it taking the steps necessary at the end of
the quarter to bring the ratio back down to approximately 30:1). 
182. For an interesting discussion of such matters, see Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability
and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2009), which explores a system of civil 
liability for mandatory securities disclosure violations by established publicly traded issuers 
wherein officers and directors would be subject to measured liability, with damages payable
to the issuer.
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is not altogether clear,183 and the moral force of an argument that essentially 
relies on the dictum “if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em” in calling for
inaction is dubious at best, that other organizational forms will be adopted 
in response to this proposal is precisely the point.  Private partnerships
are inefficient only according to one very narrow definition of that term.
As we have seen, several important societal benefits associated with having 
investment banks structured as private partnerships exist—including, for
example, the resurrection of the importance of client relationships— 
that are seldom, if ever, fully internalized by those making the decision to 
incorporate in the first place because those individuals, all too often it 
appears, are more eager to cash out quickly than to think through all the 
long-term ramifications of their decisions not just for finance but for
society more generally.184 
2.  Varying the Fiduciary Duties and Obligations Owed to Investors 
In addition to varying mandatory disclosure requirements according to
adopted ownership structures, the choice of the private partnership
structure can be similarly encouraged by varying the legal obligations or 
duties owed to investors.  In particular, as an investor and an investment
bank hold an increasing proportion of the same assets on their respective 
balance sheets, the bank, generally speaking, on some level becomes less
a fiduciary vis-à-vis the investor and more an investment partner of 
sorts.  The applicable standard of care should reflect this important fact. 
That is, the greater the extent to which the firm has also invested in the 
same financial products sold to its investor-clients, the lower,
correspondingly, should be its exposure to legal liability arising out of 
disclosures made in connection with these products; for instance, if a 
183. Compare Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism 
in Mandating State Implementation of National Environment Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196,
1196–97 (1977) (discussing the difficulties the federal government, courts, and states 
face in enforcing federal statutes), and Richard B. Stewart, The Development of 
Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental
Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 728, 736 (1977)
(discussing judicial review of the administrative action), with Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale 
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210–13 (1992) 
(discussing the “race-to-the-bottom” effect in environmental regulation that results from
interjurisdictional competition), and Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2361–63 (1998) (arguing for more
competition facilitated by a less restrictive basis for allocating regulatory jurisdiction in
the context of securities law).  See also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable 
Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 
903, 908 (1998) (discussing the race-to-the-bottom and “race-to-the-top” effect with regard to
regulatory competition among countries). 
184. See ENDLICH, supra note 129, at 8, 17–18. 
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bank has invested more than 50% of its balance sheet in a CDO in which 
it has also encouraged clients to invest, should the standard of care
relating to such actions undertaken or disclosures made to the client by
the bank in connection with the CDO really be as great as if the bank 
had invested, say, only 5%? 
The precise tradeoff between the standard of care and the equity stake
assumed is, of course, an empirical or political question.  The important
point here is only that the exposure to liability should be made to decrease 
in proportion to the equity stake assumed in the investment products 
marketed and sold to investors, and that the slope of the negative
relationship should be sufficiently steep so as to effectively induce 
investment banks to adopt ownership structures that better align their
incentives with those of their clients.185  The implicit assumption being 
made here, of course, is that a bank organized as a private partnership is 
more likely to hold the same assets as its clients than is a similarly
situated publicly traded corporation.  To the extent that this holds true, 
there then exists a cogent theoretical basis for having the standard of
care owed by investment banks, structured as private partnerships, be 
lower than the corresponding standard for equivalently positioned public
corporations because investors need not repose nearly the same measure
of trust and confidence in those with whom their financial prospects are 
closely aligned as they must in those with whom their financial prospects 
are not so closely aligned.186 
185. The tort of negligent misrepresentation, for example, could be made an unavailable
cause of action where investors have voluntarily assumed a significant equity stake in the 
recommended portfolio.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (stating the 
essential elements).  That is, by virtue of this equity stake, arbitrageurs are believed to be 
sufficiently motivated to understand their own trading strategies, and it is therefore less 
important that communications made in connection with these strategies take place in the
shadow of the civil tort of negligent misrepresentation.
186. The reader may have noted the following tension in this approach.  Consider
the case Kimmell v. Schaefer, 675 N.E.2d 450 (N.Y. 1996).  The New York Court of 
Appeals emphasized the importance of a “special relationship,” which it interpreted as 
functioning in much the same way as pecuniary interest, in its articulation of its three-
factor test to determine whether sufficient contact exists for the tort of negligent
misrepresentation to attach.  Id. at 454.  Within our framework, this inquiry is important
only insofar as it serves to clarify whether the relevant financial actor is better characterized as
an investment adviser or as a broker-dealer, a determination that we believe, as will be
discussed later, ought to be guided by bright-line rulemaking.  Once this determination is 
made, however, that is, once the special relationship exists, under the preceding approach, the
analysis then—and only then—chases after the wrong suspect in that problems lie less 
with the investment adviser who chooses to go “all in” with the client and more with the 
investment adviser who has no such pecuniary interest in, or bears no such special
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IV. BROKER-DEALERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS
This Part hopes to achieve two distinct objectives: (1) to set forth what
should be the relevant duties owed to investors by investment advisers 
and broker-dealers, respectively, and (2) to argue that the broad
condemnation of proprietary transactions, as exhibited by the reform 
proposals surveyed in Part I, is misplaced insofar as it applies
specifically to investment advisers and broker-dealers. 
A.  The Fiduciary Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers           
and Investment Advisers 
This Part describes the applicable duties and obligations that should be 
owed to investors by (1) investment advisers and (2) broker-dealers.
1.  Strengthening the Fiduciary Responsibilities of     
Investment Advisers 
Under the proposed framework, investment advisers would retain the 
same fiduciary duties as implied under the Advisers Act and its subsequent 
interpretations by the courts,187 where recall that section 206 of the
Advisers Act is the source of this federal fiduciary duty.188  Interestingly,
section 206 does not mention fiduciary duties; it states only that it is 
unlawful for investment advisers “to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice” or “to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective 
client.”189  It was not until the Supreme Court interpreted the Advisers 
Act in SEC v. Capital Gains that the concept of fiduciary duty was 
relationship to, the transaction at issue and whose incentives are consequently likely not 
as well aligned with those of the client.
187. Although not specifically addressed in the present Article, we would, of course,
additionally advocate for strengthening the requirements for registration as an investment
adviser by, for example, including bank-holding companies within the section 202 statutory
definition (15 U.S.C. § 80b-2 (2006)); lowering the section 203(b)(3) fifteen-client threshold 
(15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006)); decreasing the section 203(a)(1)(A) $25-million-assets-under- 
management threshold (15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (2006)); or doing all three of these. 
188. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 206, 54 Stat. 847, 852 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006)). 
189. Id. Section 206(3) does prohibit any registered investment adviser from engaging
in or effecting a transaction on behalf of a client while acting either as principal for its 
own account or as broker for a person other than the client, without disclosing in writing
to the client before the completion of the transaction the adviser’s role in the transaction
and obtaining the client’s consent.  See id.  Not only are we advocating for a larger set of
proscribed securities transactions but we are also not allowing, in the context of difficult-
to-price securities, mere disclosure and client consent to purge transactions of the taint of 
self-dealing. 
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imposed upon investment advisers.190  Because the exact nature of an
investment adviser’s fiduciary duty was never explicitly defined, the 
SEC has “expansive leeway” to create or redefine what obligations are
imposed.191  Although an adviser’s general duties involve promoting the
client’s financial goals, the fiduciary obligations regulated most often by 
the SEC, however, are those negative duties aimed at protecting the best
interests of investors.192 
Although the Volcker Rule, in particular, certainly hints at our 
regulatory appeal in prohibiting various bank entities from engaging in
proprietary trading or entering into certain relationships with hedge 
funds and private equity funds, we advocate pushing this idea even
further with respect to investment advisers, arguing that the SEC should
use its expansive leeway in defining what obligations are owed to 
investors to extend the section 206 fiduciary duty to explicitly include 
the restrictions set forth in sections 10(f) and 12(d)(3) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940.193 
a.  Expanding the Section 206 Fiduciary Duty To Explicitly Preclude 
Certain Affiliations with Securities-Related Businesses 
Section 10(f) of the Investment Company Act prohibits a fund from
purchasing any security during an underwriting or selling syndicate if
the fund has certain affiliated relationships with a principal underwriter 
for the security.194  The section is designed to protect fund-shareholders
by preventing an affiliated underwriter from placing or “dumping”
unmarketable securities with the fund during a primary offering.  Note 
190. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963)
(explaining only that other courts have generally defined a fiduciary duty as “an affirmative
duty of ‘utmost good faith and full and fair disclosure of all material facts’ as well as an 
affirmative obligation ‘to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading’” (quoting WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 535 (2d ed. 1955); 1 FOWLER V. HARPER 
& FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 541 (1956))). 
191. See Thomas P. Lemke & Steven W. Stone, The Madoff “Opportunity”: Harmonizing
the Overarching Standard of Care for Financial Professionals Who Give Investment Advice, 
WALL ST. LAW., June 2009, at 1, 5. 
192. See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191–92 (explaining that the rationale for finding
a fiduciary duty requirement in the Advisers Act was congressional intent to protect investors
from investment advisers who “render advice which was not disinterested”).
193. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2006)). 
194. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(f). 
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that where a fund has multiple subadvisers, however,195 section 10(f) can 
work to significantly limit the fund’s ability to purchase securities in a 
primary offering196 because a fund is subject to the prohibition in section 
10(f) if any of its advisers or subadvisers participated in the underwriting 
or selling syndicate—or are affiliated persons of such participants— 
regardless of whether or not the adviser or subadviser who recommended 
the purchase was an actual participant in the syndicate.197  To reduce the 
perceived undue restrictiveness of section 10(f), in 2003 the SEC adopted as
a final rule proposed amendments to Rule 10f-3,198 which deemed each 
“series of a series company” and the “managed portions” of a fund
portfolio to be separate registered investment companies for purposes of
section 10(f) and Rule 10f-3.199  As a result, a fund, in theory, is subject to 
the section 10(f) limitation only where the adviser recommending the
transaction or its affiliated person is actually a participant in the transaction 
and is thus in a position to take advantage of the fund.
Similarly, section 12(d)(3) of the Investment Company Act generally 
prohibits funds and companies controlled by funds from purchasing 
securities issued by a registered investment adviser, broker-dealer, or 
underwriter in securities-related businesses.200  Rule 12d3-1 permits a 
195. Many funds use “subadvisers” to help manage its assets.  A subadviser is an
investment adviser for purposes of the Advisers Act, which describes an investment 
adviser as a person who regularly furnishes advice to the fund with respect to the desirability
of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property, or is empowered to
determine what securities or other property are to be purchased or sold by the fund.  See
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20). 
196. Rule 10f-3 does provide an exemption from the prohibition in section 10(f) if
certain conditions are satisfied; in particular, Rule 10f-3 permits a fund to purchase securities
in a transaction that otherwise would violate section 10(f) if, among other things: (1) the 
securities are either registered under the Securities Act of 1933 under 15 U.S.C. § 77a-
aa, part of an issue of government securities, municipal securities with certain credit
ratings, or offered in certain foreign or private institutional offerings; (2) the
offering involves a “firm commitment” underwriting; (3) the fund—together with
other funds advised by the same investment adviser—purchases no more than 25% of the 
offering; (4) the fund purchases the securities from a member of the syndicate other than 
its affiliated underwriter; (5) the fund’s directors have approved procedures for purchases 
under the rule and regularly review the purchases to determine whether they have
complied with the procedures.  See 17 C.F.R. § 270.10f-3(a)–(c) (2010). 
197. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (defining the term affiliated persons). 
198. See Transactions of Investment Companies with Portfolio and Subadviser 
Affiliates, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,888, [2002–2003 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,815 (Jan. 14, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Adopting Release] 
(adopting Rule 17a-10 and amending Rules 10f-3, 12d3-1, 17a-6, 17d-1, and 17e-1). 
199. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.10f-3(a)(5)–(6) (defining the terms managed portion and 
series of a series company); id. § 270.10f-3(b) (deeming the series of a series company and 
managed portions of an investment company to be separate investment companies for 
purposes of section 10(f) and Rule 10f-3).
200. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(3) (2006).  With minor exceptions, section 12(d)(3)
prohibits a fund from purchasing or otherwise acquiring “any security issued by or
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fund to invest up to 5% of its assets in securities of an issuer deriving 
more than 15% of its gross revenues from securities-related businesses.201 
Pursuant to the same 2003 Adopting Release, the SEC amended Rule
12d3-1 to permit a fund to purchase securities issued by its subadvisers—or 
affiliated persons of its subadvisers—in circumstances as determined by the
SEC in which, again, in theory, the subadviser would have little, if any,
ability to take advantage of the fund because the subadviser would not 
be in a position to direct the fund’s securities purchases.202 
Observe that sections 10(f) and 12(d)(3) reflect the same concern, as 
expressed in Part III, with protecting the integrity of the primary
markets.  There, recall that the focus was on investment banks that issue
or underwrite difficult-to-price securities and the recognition that
disclosure under these circumstances tends to be ineffectual, thereby
transforming the operating standard from caveat venditor back to caveat
emptor.  Here, by contrast, the focus is on investment companies and the
general obligations that such companies owe to their shareholder-
investors when purchasing securities underwritten or issued by certain
advisers/subadvisers, for instance, possibly an affiliated investment
bank.  Specifically, the Investment Company Act recognizes that certain
important conflicts of interest might arise under the various circumstances 
described above and acts to restrict the extent to which such transactions
may be entered into as discordant with the investment company’s
any other interest in the business of any person who is a broker, a dealer, is engaged in
the business of underwriting, or is [] an investment adviser.” Id. 
201. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1 (2010).  Paragraph (a) of Rule 12d3-1 permits a 
fund to acquire any security issued by any person that, in its most recent fiscal year, derived 
15% or less of its gross revenues from securities-related activities unless the fund would
control such person after the acquisition. Id.  Paragraph (b)(3) of Rule 12d3-1 permits a
fund to invest up to 5% of the value of its total assets in the securities of an issuer that
derives more than 15% of its gross revenues from securities-related activities.  Id.  Rule
12d3-1(d)(1) defines the term securities-related activities as a person’s activities as a 
broker, a dealer, an underwriter, an investment adviser registered under the Advisers
Act, or an investment adviser to a registered investment company. Id. 
202. See 2003 Adopting Release, supra note 198, at 86,820.  The exemption in Rule
12d3-1 would be available in circumstances identical to those in which the subadviser—or
affiliated person—would be permitted by Rule 17a-10 to enter into a principal
transaction with the fund; in other words, the exemption is available if (1) the subadviser 
is not, and is not an affiliated person of, an investment adviser who provides advice with 
respect to the portion of the fund that is acquiring the securities, and (2) the advisory
contracts of the subadviser, and any subadviser who is advising the purchasing portion of 
the fund, prohibit them from consulting with each other concerning securities transactions of
the fund and limit their responsibility to providing advice with respect to discrete portions of
the fund’s portfolio.  See 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1(c)(3)(i), (ii) (2010). 
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obligation to promote the best interests of its shareholder-investors.  We
would like to see the securities law do the same for registered investment
advisers, irrespective of whether or not the funds that they advise are in
fact registered investment companies.
b.  The Distinction Between Affiliated and Unaffiliated Entities     
Must Be Drawn as Sharp and as Bright as Possible 
As one possible countervailing factor, SEC rulemaking in this area 
evinces a concern over access to capital markets; for example, in its 
recitation of the expected benefits of its new rules announced under its 
2003 Adopting Release, the SEC stated that the amendments included 
therein would likely benefit funds, fund shareholders, and subadvisers in
the form of increased capital formation by (1) broadening the investments 
opportunities available to such funds and (2) expanding the range of 
possible purchasers where a subadviser participates in an underwriting 
syndicate.203  To achieve these regulatory goals, however, note that the
SEC was required to blur the distinction between what it means to be an 
affiliated as opposed to an unaffiliated adviser/subadviser. 
Indeed, this is exactly the same kind of blurring that we will encounter 
in Part IV.A.2 in examining the legislative response to the conflicts of
interest that very often arise between broker-dealers and investor-clients. 
There, we will see that the Investor Protection Act blurs the distinction 
between broker-dealers and registered investment advisers in deeming, 
under certain circumstances, the duties owed by broker-dealers to be 
equivalent to those owed by investment advisers in an effort to bring 
within the fold of legal liability certain conflicts of interest not captured 
by current statutory definitions, namely, of broker-dealers and investment 
advisers.  Here, by contrast, the blurring occurs to remove certain
transactions from out of this fold, with the 2003 Adopting Release holding 
certain transactions not to be true conflicts, even though the statutory 
definitions would suggest otherwise. 
This smudging of definitions is arguably indicative of a more general 
tendency on the part of SEC rulemakers to accommodate, in the face of
ever-expanding multinational financial conglomerates, the inevitable 
conflicts of interest that arise by manipulating definitions to pinpoint and
isolate only those transactions of actual concern.204  That is, rather than
203. See 2003 Adopting Release, supra note 198, at 88,820. 
 204. Proposed Rule 202(a)(11)-1 is illustrative to that effect. The SEC deemed certain 
broker-dealers not to be investment advisers, using the authority granted to it under 
section 202(a)(11)(F), which exempts “such other persons not to be within the intent of 
[the enumerated exceptions], as the Commission may designate by rules and regulations 
or order,” to expand the exemption to broker-dealers who offer fee-based accounts 
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simply say that investment companies should not engage in certain
securities transactions and leave it at that, an attempt is made instead to
carve out some subset of transactions not properly characterized as
impermissible self-dealing.  In theory, there is nothing intrinsically
wrong with this approach to rulemaking—if executed properly, it perhaps 
gets us the closest to the optimal outcome—but optimality is not such an 
easy goal to achieve in practice.  The numerous provisions associated 
with narrowly tailored rulemaking of this sort, certainly at the start, will 
very likely be subject to various errors of overexclusivity and
underexclusivity—some of which may in fact flow directly from actions 
undertaken by firms solely or in large part to avoid the rules’ regulatory
ambit.205 
But also, more importantly, it runs the risk of attenuating just what it 
means to be a fiduciary in the first instance.  To be a fiduciary no longer 
means simply not engaging in self-dealing transactions with affiliates; it
now means not engaging in self-dealing transactions with affiliates but
only if states of the world X, Y, and Z also hold true.  These regulatory
qualifications introduce and amplify much-unneeded uncertainty or lack of
salience as to the roles played by the various actors within the financial
system.  In other words, although enforcement costs may or may not 
providing both advisory and brokerage services for a fixed or asset-based fee, as long as 
the advice is “incidental” to the brokerage services and there is an explicit statement that
the account is a brokerage and not an advisory account—though, inexplicably, brokers 
would have been able to still call themselves “advisers.”  Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 202(a)(11(F), 54 Stat. 847, 849 (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-2(a)(11)(G) (2006)); see Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment 
Advisers, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,226 (proposed Nov. 4, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
275, 279 ).  In Financial Planning Association v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated Rule 202(a)(11)-1, very
sensibly finding that the SEC had exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the rule. The
court reasoned that Congress had specifically addressed where a broker-dealer should be 
exempted from the requirements of the Advisers Act in the statute itself. Id. at 488. 
Because Rule 202(a)(11)-1 exempts a broader group of broker-dealers than
contemplated by the statute, it hence conflicts with the expressed intent of Congress. Id.
The court further reasoned that Congress, by use of the term other persons in section
202(a)(11)(F), limited the rulemaking authority of the SEC to persons providing advisory
services other than broker-dealers.  See id. at 491. 
205. As the SEC itself noted, the amendments may encourage division of funds into 
discrete parts managed by multiple subadvisers. See 2003 Adopting Release, supra note
198, at 86,822 (“[A] fund that is advised by a subadviser that participates [or is affiliated 
with persons that participate] in underwriting syndicates may have an incentive to
reorganize in order to . . . take advantage of the opportunity to purchase securities in
reliance on that rule’s exemption.”).
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increase with the complexity of narrowly tailored rules, there is the 
undoubted additional cost—one all too often overlooked or downplayed, so
we argue—of, at best, increased uncertainty and, at worst, increased
hostility and distrust of a financial system that is maligned not so much 
because the system screws investors over because investors know that
the world is a hard place but rather because the system is not upfront and 
honest about this fact from the very start. 
In short, the argument is that the costs of blurring the lines with 
respect to which actors are in a position per se to take advantage of a
given fund exceed the costs of an overinclusive approach that simply
does not allow such actors to align themselves in ways that might lead to 
basic, fundamental conflicts of interest, which, in this particular case,
means simply not allowing investment advisers—and, a fortiori, investment 
companies—to engage in certain securities transactions, including
purchasing securities from affiliated underwriters or acquiring nontrivial
equity stakes in various securities-related businesses.  It is admittedly a 
more dramatic step than any taken or contemplated by the SEC thus far. 
It involves telling very powerful and influential financial institutions that
they are no longer allowed to organize themselves as they see best fit.  It 
will, without doubt, result in a lot of heated and angry rhetoric about
inefficiencies and economies of scale and intolerable infringements upon
the freedom to contract.206 
But all of this is to be courageously ignored.  In insisting that
investment advisers avoid certain securities transactions as prescribed
above, the problem is cleanly solved—the conflicts of interest are 
immediately gone.  And the only obvious cost associated with this
solution is that an investment adviser can no longer be “affiliated” with
certain securities-related businesses.  Although SEC rulemaking, for
whatever reasons, takes it as given that such corporate organizations be 
allowed to take place—indeed, it is the very baseline from which its 
rulemaking efforts appear to depart—we query whether this is in fact the 
right baseline and ask just how substantial a cost it really is, say, to not
allow an investment bank to “affiliate” in the first instance with funds 
run by a registered investment adviser.  This Article takes the position 
206. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt & Eric Lichtblau, A Finance Overhaul Fight Draws a
Lobbying Swarm, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, at A1 (reporting that “more than 1,500
lobbyists, executives, bankers and others have made their way to the Senate committee
that on Wednesday will take up legislation to rein in derivatives”); Noam Scheiber, Head
Lock: The Inside Story of How Goldman and the Banks Are Getting Clobbered on
Financial Reform, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 20, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/ 
article/economy/the-state-play-financial-regulation-edition (reporting that “[s]ome two dozen
executives from large corporations will be descending on Capitol Hill today to make the 
case against over-regulating derivatives”). 
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that the cost is minimal relative to the cost of further confusing investors
about those in whom they can repose their trust and confidence and in
whom they cannot.
c.  The Illusory Benefits of Information Barriers 
Of course, investment banks will argue that they have already, in 
effect, achieved this separation with the construction of “Chinese Walls”
or “information barriers,”207 that such restrictions on the flow of
information represent a less dramatic means of limiting the purported 
conflicts of interest.208  But as Martin Lipton—no great defender of the
information-barriers approach to conflicts of interest209—keenly observed, 
there are two situations that do cause concern: (1) where the firm makes
investment recommendations to its clients, and (2) where the firm
invests for its own account.210  In either of these two situations, at least 
two factors argue in favor of an absolute prohibition on investment 
transactions in securities as to which even an isolated department of the 
firm has inside information: (1) the need to conform to an investor’s
reasonable expectations and (2) the very practical consideration of
removing human temptation.211 
 207. The term Chinese Walls is not without its critics. See, e.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 873, 887–88 (Ct. App. 1988) (Low, P.J., concurring).
We opt, therefore, for the anodyne term information barriers. 
208. See Martin Lipton & Robert B. Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict
Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459, 499 (1975) [hereinafter Lipton & 
Mazur, Chinese Wall Solution].  See generally Leonard Chazen, Reinforcing the Chinese 
Wall: A Response, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 552 (1976); Leo Herzel & Dale E. Colling, The 
Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 BUS. LAW. 73 (1978); Leo Herzel & Dale 
E. Colling, The Chinese Wall Revisited, 6 CORP. L. REV. 116 (1983); Martin Lipton & Robert
B. Mazur, The Chinese Wall: A Reply to Chazen, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 579 (1976). 
209. At least this was the case thirty-five years ago.
210. Lipton & Mazur, Chinese Wall Solution, supra note 208, at 499.  Lipton finds 
that “no public interest [is] to be served” in permitting own-account investments in the face 
of inside information.  Id. at 501.  To the extent that the proprietary traders purchase any 
part of the issuance, it is hard to see how an investment bank can issue/underwrite securities 
while at the same time engaging in proprietary trading on its own capital account.  It would 
appear just such an impermissible own-account investment.  Nevertheless, the solution 
adopted by today’s publicly incorporated investment banks is to implement just the very 
information barrier of which Lipton had this to say: “The possibility of self-interest abuse 
mandates that the [information-barriers] approach not be extended to permit a firm with 
departmentally isolated inside information to invest for its own account through a department 
that does not have the information.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
211. Id. at 499. 
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Specifically, where one department within the firm is making
recommendations or rendering investment advice contrary to inside 
information in the possession of another isolated department, it would
appear to be an arrangement that simply does not meet the reasonable 
expectations of investors who rely on these recommendations and whose
dependence on such recommendations is essential to the continuance of
public participation in the securities markets.212 Accordingly, “[i]t
cannot, therefore, be accepted that some kind of disclosure by the 
broker-dealer at the commencement of the customer relationship (to
the effect that because of the broker-dealer’s [information-barrier]
procedures the client may in the future be the victim of a bad
recommendation) would satisfy this expectation.”213  Lipton confines
his discussion, however, to average public investors who interact
with broker-dealers offering investment advice; he is less concerned—if at 
all—with a firm that combines professional investment management with
investment banking.  We take the exact opposite position.  We are much 
more concerned with conflicts of interest arising in connection with 
professional investment management than we are with those involving 
the average lay investor. 
The distinction Lipton draws is grounded in notions of investor
sophistication.  Objecting to the concept that mere disclosure of a firm’s
information-barrier policies is sufficient to meet the reasonable expectations
of the typical retail customer, Lipton views the typical investment-manager
client, however, as much more sophisticated and the nature of his
relationship with the firm much more close, such that these types of 
disclosures are now much more meaningful.214  As has been emphasized
throughout, we do not, in the context of difficult-to-price securities, place 
much weight on these kinds of distinctions.  Moreover, although Lipton 
does acknowledge that an investment bank, unlike a major commercial 
bank, will not usually have confidential relationships with a large number of 
clients and that, accordingly, a policy against the investment management 
division’s trading in securities issued/underwritten by the investment
banking division should not unduly impinge upon the range of available 
investment opportunities—less true today—he suggests that such a policy
would nevertheless place investment banks at a disadvantage with respect 
to commercial banks in the competition for investment management 
business.215  In response to this, we say “good” because unlike Lipton, we
212. See id. at 502. 
213. Id. at 503. 
214. Id. at 508. 
215. Id. at 509. 
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believe that the investment management conflict problem is of sufficiently
important moment to warrant imposing such a competitive disadvantage.
Indeed, the idea of one employee’s not communicating information to 
another employee, the receipt of which would result in significant profit 
or the avoidance of significant loss, appears in our view so contrary to 
human nature and temptation as to be wholly unworkable as a valid, 
legally recognizable defense.216  The law must have as its essential 
foundations as realistic a view of human behavior as possible.  Recognizing
an information-barrier defense in this context would seem to fail this test
rather emphatically, where the experience of the financial sector has, 
time and time again, cast substantial doubt on the effectiveness of
voluntary restrictions on the flow of information within a single firm.217 
Rather, the weight of empirical evidence appears to establish just the
opposite—that such walls do not work particularly well in practice, with
large securities firms having repeatedly sought to establish separate 
underwriting divisions only to find the attempted structural separation to 
have been wholly inadequate as a means of preventing inside information 
known to its underwriting division from also becoming known to its 
brokerage or investment management divisions or both.218  For all the
foregoing reasons, we thus reject the claim that the information-barriers
approach represents a truly workable means of limiting the conflicts of
interest that invariably arise where investment advisers “affiliate” with 
securities-related businesses—most notably, issuers/underwriters. 
2.  Eliminating the Fiduciary Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers 
Consider an ordinary sales transaction of a security from a broker-
dealer to an investor.  Generally speaking, there are three types of
communications that can be made by the broker-dealer with respect to
this transaction: (1) security X is for sale into your account, (2) security
216. As the Second Circuit noted in Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 
398, 402 (2d Cir. 1974), it is one thing to establish an information barrier for prophylactic 
purposes and quite another to use that barrier as a valid legal defense against liability.
217. A respectable number of securities industry professionals share the view that
“[a]nyone who believes in Chinese Walls in the secondary markets believes in fairies.” 
Interview with Peter Quinnen, Chairman, James Capel & Co. (Feb. 25, 1987), quoted in
Norman S. Poser, Chinese Wall or Emperor’s New Clothes? Regulating Conflicts of Interest
of Securities Firms in the U.S. and the U.K., 9 MICH. Y.B. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 91 (1988). 
218. See, e.g., Slade, 517 F.2d at 401; see also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 34TH ANNUAL 
REPORT 8–9 (1968) (concluding that Merrill Lynch was unable to successfully keep within its
underwriting division information concerning the decreased earnings of Douglas Aircraft). 
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X is for sale, and I recommend that you purchase it for your account, or
(3) security X is for sale, and I have purchased it for your account.  In
some ways, the nature of the relationship can be determined and defined
solely on the basis of these three types of communications alone.  The 
first, for instance, corresponds to the fully nondiscretionary account, 
meaning that the customer makes the investment decisions and the
broker merely receives and executes the customer’s order. This
relationship does not give rise to a general fiduciary duty219—only to the
lesser duty of suitability and other related ministerial requirements.220 
The third communication, on the other hand, corresponds to a fully 
discretionary account.  In this situation, the broker-dealer assumes a role 
equivalent to an investment adviser, and the fiduciary duties and obligations
associated therein thus attach here.221 
It is the second communication where things become a bit more 
complicated, namely, the case where the investment adviser offers some
form of investment advice in connection with a security sales transaction. 
Section 103 would solve the thorny issue of investment advice—the 
second situation—by rendering the fiduciary duties owed to retail 
investors by broker-dealers equivalent to those owed by investment 
219. See, e.g., Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157 
F.3d 933, 940 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that under New York law “there is no general 
fiduciary duty inherent in an ordinary broker/customer relationship,” that “[s]uch a duty
can arise only where the customer has delegated discretionary trading authority to the 
broker”); see also Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999) (securities); 
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (derivative 
swaps); Fekety v Gruntal & Co., 595 N.Y.S.2d 190 (App. Div. 1993) (securities). 
220. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers—What’s in a Name?, 11
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 36–37 (2005) (contrasting broker’s duty of suitability with 
adviser’s fiduciary duty, including duty to monitor and to avoid self-dealing transactions 
without informed consent); John C. Coffee, Jr., Changes Needed Before Fed Is Given 
Regulatory Mission, N.Y. L.J., July 16, 2009, at 5, 5–6 (contrasting broker’s duties of 
suitability imposed by FINRA with investment adviser’s duty); see also Michael Koffler,
Six Degrees of Separation: Principles To Guide the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and 
Investment Advisers, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 776, 781 (2009). 
221. See, e.g., Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp.
951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (noting that by acquiring fiduciary status, the broker-dealer 
handling a discretionary account is required to “(1) manage the account in a manner directly
comporting with the needs and objectives of the customer as stated in the authorization
papers or as apparent from the customer’s investment and trading history . . . ; (3) keep
his customer informed as to each completed transaction; and (4) explain forthrightly the 
practical impact and potential risks of the course of dealing in which the broker is engaged” 
(citation omitted)).  Furthermore, where the broker handling a discretionary account 
engages in an active trading strategy, “particularly where such trading deviates from the
customer’s stated investment goals or is more risky than the average customer would 
prefer, he has an affirmative duty to explain the possible consequences of his actions to 
his customers.”  Id. at 954. 
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advisers—the third situation.222  It is important to understand that if enacted 
by Congress as written, section 103 would represent a dramatic departure 
from current law in most jurisdictions—notably, New York, where state
law governs the vast majority of customer agreements entered into by
securities broker-dealers.223 
a.  The Distinction Between Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers 
Must Be Drawn as Sharp and as Bright as Possible 
In support of establishing a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers offering
investment advice to retail investors, the Treasury White Paper argues
that “retail investors are often confused about the differences between
investment advisers and broker-dealers.”224  Although no doubt true, 
introducing legislation that would heighten the duty owed by securities 
broker-dealers offering investment advice to retail customers who
maintain nondiscretionary securities brokerage accounts would seem to
only further increase, not decrease, this understandable confusion.  We 
argue, by contrast, that the particularities of the broker-dealer relationship 
are better suited to bright-line rulemaking, and not to the enactment of 
222. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. § 7103 (2009) (enacted).
223. See, e.g., Liberman v. Worden, 701 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420–21 (App. Div. 2000) 
(holding that a broker-dealer does not owe a fiduciary duty to a customer who maintains a 
standard nondiscretionary account); Perl v. Smith Barney Inc., 646 N.Y.S.2d 678, 680
(App. Div. 1996). Under New York law, such customers are owed limited duties
that arise on a transaction-by-transaction basis only; specifically, a broker-dealer owes its
nondiscretionary account customers “duties of diligence and competence in executing the 
client’s trade orders, and is obliged to give honest and complete information when
recommending a purchase or sale.” De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 
1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 2002).  The duties owed by a broker-dealer to a nondiscretionary
account customer “ordinarily end after each transaction is done, and thus do not include 
a duty to offer unsolicited information, advice, or warnings concerning the customer’s 
investments.”  Id.  In other words, a customer who maintains a nondiscretionary account 
“may enjoy the broker’s advice and recommendation with respect to a given trade, but
has no legal claim on the broker’s ongoing attention.”  Id.; see also Richard A. Rosen, The
Kwiatkowski Decision: Implications for the Nature and Scope of Duties of Brokers and 
FCM’s to Their Customers, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Dec. 2002, at 10. 
 224. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 71; see also  ANGELA A. HUNG ET
AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 40 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov 
/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf (suggesting several possible reasons for this
confusion, including interchangeable titles used by financial firms—the term financial 
adviser is often used by both broker-dealers and investment advisers—and including the
use of “we do it all” advertisements that blur the distinction between broker-dealers and
investment advisers). 
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vague and ambiguous standards ostensibly embodied in legal concepts 
such as “fiduciary duty” and “investment advice.”  In this context ex
ante predictability and certainty are of paramount importance.  Investors 
must be presented with sharp and understandable rules that make clear 
and set forth the exact nature of their relationships to the intermediaries 
with whom they are forced to interact within the financial system.225 
In other words, the principal focus here must lie in maximizing the 
salience for investors of the nature of the various duties and obligations 
owed to them.  As long as the full scope of these duties and obligations 
is disclosed to investors in a clear and sensible way, ex post fairness and 
the need for flexibility remain only as peripheral concerns. This is
true, so the argument goes, because the expected benefits of 
further blurring the legal distinctions between investment advisers and 
broker-dealers—as House Bill 4173 contemplates—are more than 
outweighed by the expected costs of additionally muddling the reasonable 
expectations of investors, who, in setting foot into the dark and muddy
waters of the financial system, must now interrelate with a vast and wild 
panoply of different financial creatures, many of whose underlying purposes 
and motivations are not always immediately apparent—or benign.
This blurring is defended on the basis of prior empirical research 
demonstrating that an investment adviser and a broker-dealer providing 
“incidental” advice226 appear virtually identical from the vantage point
of the retail customer.227  Indeed, the Treasury White Paper goes as far 
as plainly concluding that the distinction is “no longer meaningful” and 
that the current statutory and regulatory framework is “based on antiquated 
distinctions between the two types of financial professionals that date 
back to the early 20th century.”228  We are not nearly so prepared to 
225. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400–01, 406
(1985); see also Clayton P. Gillete, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 
82 VA. L. REV. 181, 230–31 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 589, 622 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis 
and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 25–26, 43 (2000); 
Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 
116 (1997). 
226. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2006) (excluding from the definition of the term
investment adviser “any broker or dealer whose performance of such services is solely
incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special 
compensation therefore”).
227. See HUNG ET AL., supra note 224, at 4, 113 (conducting a national household 
survey with 654 respondents and holding six focus groups in September 2007 to gauge 
the extent to which investors understand the differences between broker-dealers and
investment advisers and concluding that as the industry becomes increasingly complex, with 
financial firms increasingly more heterogeneous and intertwined, investors, as a consequence, 
increasingly lack a clear understanding as to the different functions and fiduciary
responsibilities of these two financial professionals). 
 228. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at 71. 
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deem as irrelevant the enduring wisdom of our legislative forefathers. 
Broker-dealers and investment advisers—as hopefully our stylized 
conceptual framework makes clear—play distinct roles in the financial 
system and are characterized by important differences.229  As was  the  
intent of the original drafters, the securities laws should recognize and
attempt to make as salient as possible these fundamental differences and
not paper over them with conclusory statements that such views are now 
“antiquated” as regards the realities of today’s financial marketplace.230 
Indeed, as will be discussed more specifically in Part IV.B, the 
market-making activities of broker-dealers invariably result in certain
conflicts of interest that just do not—or should not—apply in the context 
of investment management.  The broker-dealer, who makes money on the 
difference between the bid and ask price of a security, is continuously 
striving to buy as low or sell as high as possible.  As an investor on the 
opposite side of a transaction, the broker-dealer—in ways not applicable
to the investment adviser—is thus always striving to some extent to 
screw you, the investor, over.  That is, in selling at the highest price 
asked or buying at the lowest price bid, the broker-dealer—even if he or 
she knows or strongly suspects that the ask price is too high or the bid 
price too low—is under no obligation whatsoever to give you a bargain, 
and this remains true regardless of whether or not the broker-dealer is
selling out of his or her own inventory of securities or transacting at the
request of another client-customer. 
In structuring the securities statutes as they did, the original drafters 
were more than well aware of this harsh reality of financial market-
229. See, e.g., Aguilar, supra note 19. 
230. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and
Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 396, 412–13 (2010).  In this interesting paper, Laby
argues that changes in the way brokers market their services as well as changes in the 
type of compensation charged have altered the nature of the relationship between brokers 
and their customers. Id. at 416, 422–23.  In our view, this is not indicative of a change in
the underlying relationship, just the compensation structure—and confusingly so.  Laby
further argues that changes in securities trading resulting from changes in technology
have rendered brokerage a commodity that no longer entails the level of judgment and
skill required to conduct brokerage services in the bygone era of the early twentieth
century. See id. at 412–16.  This does not appear to be an accurate description of today’s
high-frequency algorithmic trading shops, for example, that seem to hire almost exclusively
young graduates from Cal Tech and M.I.T.  Indeed, with the advent of so much financial 
innovation, it is not entirely clear that, as compared with eighty years ago, the ever-changing 
business of market-making differs more, not less, from the provision of investment advisory
services.
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making.231  Today, it remains the job of securities law to ensure that
investors remain similarly aware.  Investors must understand that their 
best interests are not always well aligned with the broker-dealers with
whom they transact, that the Walrasian auctioneer is not always acting to 
maximize the rate of return subject only to the investor’s stated risk 
preferences—as do investment advisers, ideally.  Rather than attempt to 
ignore or gloss over this important fact, advocates of financial reform 
would be wise to understand and accept this as an essential aspect of
market-making activities and of providing liquidity to the market, and 
design and promote laws that accordingly make this distinction as salient
as possible to investors. 
Indeed, it is not so terribly important how the line is drawn—be it on
the basis of whether the customer account is discretionary or nondiscretionary
or whether the method of compensation is fee-based or asset-based232— 
only that it be as clear and as bright as possible that investors know, 
right from the start, on what side of the line they stand—whether they
are dealing with ally or with foe—and that where the investor does
indeed choose to go it alone, the investor not be allowed to seek 
recompense for losses incurred as a consequence of that choice from 
those who happened to incidentally offer investment advice at some 
point along the way.  The Investor Protection Act, in having the nature 
of the fiduciary duty depend on whether the retail investor can properly 
be characterized as having received financial investment advice—a
factual determination sure to be fraught with all kinds of evidentiary 
difficulties—creates significant uncertainty along these lines and thus 
fails this decidedly important test. 
B.  In Support of Proprietary Trading
Finally, recall from above that section 103 of the Investor Protection 
Act is written so as to empower the SEC to promulgate rules and
regulations providing that the “standard of conduct for all brokers, 
dealers, and investment advisers, when providing personalized investment 
advice about securities to retail customers . . . shall be to act [solely] in
231. See Flynn, supra note 157. 
232. In 1994, the SEC released the Tully Report, concluding, among other things, 
that firms should base at least a portion of a registered representative’s compensation on assets
held in an account, regardless of whether any transactions occur, which, in turn, unhelpfully
precipitated a move by certain broker-dealers to offer fee-based brokerage services in
lieu of commissions. See  DANIEL P. TULLY, WARREN E. BUFFET, RAYMOND A. MASON,
SAMUEL L. HAYES III & THOMAS E. O’HARA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION 
PRACTICES 5–6 (1995).  Contrary to the Tully Report, we are skeptical of such blurring
of the lines and would argue instead in favor of drawing a sharp distinction between 
charging brokerage commissions and asset-based fees. 
1066
BUNTING POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/26/2011 11:23 AM       























   
 
 
[VOL. 48:  993, 2011] The Trouble with Investment Banking 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the best interest of the customer.”233  Of course, financial intermediaries 
should not be actively striving to structure and recommend investment 
strategies that run counter to the best interests of their clients.  But we
worry that the above-cited language, coupled with language in the
Volcker Rule to the effect that the ban on proprietary trading might also 
apply to certain nonbank financial entities,234 goes further than that, 
appearing to endorse a regulatory philosophy directly contrary to the one 
set forth in this Article insofar as it emphasizes reducing the extent to
which broker-dealers and investment advisers are allowed to have a
personal financial stake in the various investment strategies that they
advise and recommend to their investor-clients. 
Placing this within our conceptual framework, one possible consequence 
of this regulatory approach would be to discourage—by punishing those 
decisions that a regulator deemed not “[solely] in the best interest of the
customer”235—the extent to which broker-dealers and investment
advisers invest their own hard-earned money in the business—in the
process, of course, thereby exacerbating the negative consequences of
the behavioral effects isolated and discussed above.  In other words, 
where Congress may be content to place more weight on greed and self-
dealing, we think it better to place more emphasis on research effort and
well-informed decisionmaking.  We believe that it is better to have 
financial actors who are well informed but sometimes try to screw us
over than it is to have such same actors who are disinterested but have 
no idea whatsoever what they are doing.  At least if financial actors are
well informed, then we can always come back to the disclosure model
and think carefully about how this knowledge and information might be 
publicly disclosed in some meaningful way, rather than have to resort to 
more intrusive steps, such as those as envisioned by section 103, directly
regulating how private companies choose to compensate their own
employees.236 
233. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. § 7103 (2009) (enacted).
234. See Volcker Rule, supra note 4.
235. See Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. § 103(a)(2) 
(2010). 
236. See H.R. 3817 § 103 (2010). 
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1.  Two Arguments for Allowing Proprietary Transactions with    
Respect to Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers 
There are at least two arguments that can be made to explain why,
with respect to broker-dealers and investment advisers as defined herein, 
we might want to encourage, rather than proscribe, proprietary trading
and other principal investments of this kind: (1) the task of defining what 
properly qualifies as proprietary trading does not appear to be grounded in a
coherent theory as to why it should be proscribed in the first place, and
(2) proprietary traders are less likely to exhibit the house money and 
earned money effects introduced above.
a.  A Distinction Void of Theoretical Content 
We suggest that proprietary trading, as defined in the Volcker Rule, is 
wanting a coherent theoretical underpinning, and as a result, it is vague 
and ambiguous, with the regulation of this not well-defined activity
therefore likely to be relatively costly in terms of the inevitable need for
elucidative administrative and judicial rulemaking.  In particular, the 
Volcker Rule makes a distinction between, on the one hand, purchasing 
and selling securities for the “institution’s or company’s own trading 
book” and, on the other hand, doing so as “part of market making
activities.”237  This seems a distinction without real meaning in that
market-making activities will almost always involve trading on the 
firm’s “own trading book.”238 
It would seem that the distinction finds its most compelling theoretical
basis where conceived as an attempt to sequester a particular subset of
trades wherein the broker-dealer is likely to be unacceptably conflicted
vis-à-vis nonproprietary customers—an attempt that arguably reflects a
more general tendency on the part of commentators and other social 
analysts to want to describe all financial failures and all financial crises
as the direct result of a Wall Street culture of unbridled greed run amok, 
a case of out-of-control egomaniacs ever-fattening their wallets to the 
detriment of innocent and otherwise unwitting investors.239  To the extent  
237. Volcker Rule, supra note 4.
238. Moreover, the phrase market-making activities seems impermissibly
broad, opening up the possibility for all sorts of transactions to be improperly described as
market-making in an attempt to avoid the ban on proprietary trading. 
239. See, e.g., CHARLES GASPARINO, THE SELLOUT: HOW THREE DECADES OF WALL
STREET GREED AND GOVERNMENT MISMANAGEMENT DESTROYED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM (2009); MARK GILBERT, COMPLICIT: HOW GREED AND COLLUSION MADE THE
CREDIT CRISIS UNSTOPPABLE (2010); BARRY RITHOLTZ, BAILOUT NATION: HOW GREED 
AND EASY MONEY CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY (2009);
ANDREW SPENCER, TOWER OF THIEVES: INSIDE AIG’S CULTURE OF CORPORATE GREED 
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that this characterization of the underlying concerns and motivations is 
correct, we argue that the Volcker ban misses the mark insofar as this
self-dealing by securities traders is far more extensive than would be 
otherwise suggested by how the line is presently drawn. 
To amplify, consider the three different forms of trading that typically 
take place in a financial firm providing liquidity to the market:
(1) proprietary trading, (2) principal transactions, and (3) agency trading.240 
The term proprietary trading can generally be defined as trading on
behalf of the firm’s account.241  Proprietary traders buy and sell at their own 
discretion, with the primary purpose of seeking profit potential for the 
firm’s account, independent of the commission- and spread-based trading 
that defines the flow and is the main focus of principal traders; that is,
proprietary trader’s profits and positions are driven by the success of
their trading strategies and models and not by arbitrage or repositioning
around client-driven trade execution.
Principal transactions, by contrast, occur where the trader provides 
liquidity by committing capital to the opposite side of a client-driven 
trade.242  In particular, if the client is a buyer, then the trader is either 
selling from inventory or taking a short position; if the client is a seller,
then the trader is either adding to inventory or taking a long position. 
Principal transactions fit into the broader category of flow trading.243 
Note that the majority of securities traders at the major brokerage houses 
are flow traders, not proprietary traders,244 where also included within 
flow trading is agency trading, in which the broker acts solely to execute
(2009); see also ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON
(2004); BRIAN CRUVER, ANATOMY OF GREED: THE UNSHREDDED TRUTH FROM AN ENRON 
INSIDER (2002). 
240. In electronic financial markets, the term algorithmic trading refers to the use 
of computer programs for entering trading orders with the algorithm deciding on aspects 
of the order, such as the timing, price, or quantity of the order, or in many cases initiating the
order without human intervention.  Algorithmic trading may be used to implement any one of
the three different forms of trading. 
241. See generally MARK T. WILLIAMS, UNCONTROLLED RISK: LESSONS OF LEHMAN 
BROTHERS AND HOW SYSTEMIC RISK CAN STILL BRING DOWN THE WORLD FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM 74 (2010). 
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See, e.g., Cyrus Sanati, Wall St. Tries To Put a Price on Volcker Rule, N.Y.
TIMES  DEALBOOK (Jan. 28, 2010, 6:33 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/ 
wall-st-tries-to-put-a-price-on-the-volcker-rule/. 
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trades for the client by buying and selling securities, typically equities, 
on a commission fee basis only.245 
It is important to understand that most principal transactions also take 
on some proprietary risk as well.  Somewhat confusingly, this risk is 
commonly referred to as “principal risk,” which refers to the direct
market exposure of the firm’s account in being on the opposite side of a 
transaction with a client—as opposed to an agency transaction where the 
firm takes on no risk and only charges the client a fee for its services.246 
Although the amount of principal risk assumed by the trading desk will
vary according to the firm and product, rarely will a desk be perfectly
hedged; normally, it will have some principal risk exposure by, for instance, 
choosing to remain long after buying an asset from a client.  The likely 
reason for the confusion in this area is that under both types of transactions,
the firm has exposure with respect to its profit and loss statement.  The 
difference, of course, is that the primary purpose of a proprietary transaction 
is the assumption of risk, often across multiple asset classes—you have 
an idea and you risk the firm’s capital on it—where, by contrast, for
principal transactions, this exposure is mainly a byproduct of the retail 
flow—you take the other side of a trade to earn a spread, and this cannot be 
done without exposure however temporarily the position is held—which,
unlike proprietary trading, is often limited to the specific product expertise 
of a given trading desk. 
Observe, though, that these principal transactions result in exactly the 
same kinds of conflicts of interest that in all likelihood so irk proponents 
of the ban on proprietary trading.  To see this, consider, for example, the 
question of what happens where an important institutional client is right 
on market direction: the market is plummeting, and the client is selling 
into it by asking a principal trader to serve as the buyer in the falling 
market. It is a delicate situation with respect to managing client
relationships.247  What price to bid?  The principal trader has to show a
price in the context of the market.  If the bid is too low, then the trader
runs the risk that the client will be insulted and the relationship 
permanently impaired.  The trader could widen the bid/ask spread to reflect 
the increased risk in trading in the asset and better cover turnover costs.
Provided there is a buyer to match against the seller—where real money 
sometimes does buy independent of the market—the trader could set up a 
riskless trade.  Similarly, the asset could be overhedged on the expectation 
245. See Robert D. Arnott & Wayne H. Wagner, The Measurement and Control of 
Trading Costs, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 1990, at 73, 78. 
246. See Richard Dale, Risk Management in U.S. Derivative Clearing Houses, 3
Y.B. INT’L FIN. & ECON. L. 13, 16 (1998). 
247. The assumption here is that it is simply bad business to tell an important client
that a bid is not available.
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of further price depreciation, or alternatively, the client might be
convinced that now is not the right time to unload the asset, assuming, of
course, that legitimate reasons exist for saying so, and if not, the trader 
might step in as an agent and work the client out of the asset.  The point 
of all of this is not necessarily to identify which response is the correct
response but only to highlight the difficult conflicts of interest that 
predictably arise when trading as a market-maker, even where that 
trading might not be properly classified as proprietary trading as that
term is defined under the Volcker Rule.248 
Indeed, it is really only the agency broker who is truly free of the
kinds of conflicts presumably motivating the reform proposals, and the
agency broker is an endangered species, everyday becoming increasingly 
less relevant with the ever-growing number of electronic communication
networks (ECNs) and dark pools—crossing networks that provide 
liquidity where neither the price nor the identities of the counterparties 
are displayed on the order books249—where, moreover, it does not
require a great deal of imagination to envision how a firm engaged only
in agency trading might very naturally soon expand its market-making
operations into principal and proprietary transactions.250  The Volcker  
Rule would attempt to proscribe only the latter expansion.  Rather than 
expend costly regulatory resources to monitor and enforce this vague 
and ambiguous distinction, which, as we have seen, cannot be supported 
on the theoretical basis of eliminating conflicts of interest alone, we
advocate the exact opposite position—more proprietary trading, not less. 
248. See Volcker Rule, supra note 4, § 13(f)(1). 
249. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3598
(proposed Jan. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (stating that today’s increasingly 
complex financial markets have broken up into four distinct sectors: (1) registered exchanges 
(63.8%); (2) ECNs (10.8%); (3) dark pools (7.9%); and (4) trading inside broker-dealers 
(17.5%)). 
250. The following question may have occurred to the reader: why do investors 
need to go through an agency brokerage to buy and sell securities?  Is that not what, say, 
E*TRADE is for?  The answer is the size of the transactions.  If a mutual fund wishes to 
buy one million shares of stock, it would be too large for the market to absorb, disrupting 
the share price substantially.  The job of the agency trader is thus to divide the order into 
smaller pieces and buy various portions at certain intervals throughout the day, that is, to 
execute optimal order timing and order routing. 
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b.  Failing To Take Account of Important Behavioral Effects 
Further, banning proprietary transactions as a fix to the somewhat 
misconceived conflict of interest problems discussed above would serve 
to aggravate the house money and earned money effects that have been
identified at several points throughout this Article as being particularly 
important when trading in difficult-to-price financial instruments.  In our 
view, the trouble arises in the issuance and subsequent market-making of
these securities not so much because arbitrageurs are relentlessly 
subordinating the best interests of their clients in a mad dash to make as 
much money as humanly possible but more because all too often nobody 
really knows what is going on or what the hell they are doing. Large 
sums of money cannot be unaccounted for at various points in time.  The 
different trading desks do not communicate with each other.  Managers 
and directors are hopelessly unfamiliar with fundamental aspects of the 
very businesses over which they are purportedly in charge. 
And all of this takes place in part because a lot of money is being
made in the short run but also in larger part because the actors involved 
are endowed with the luxury to be ill informed as such.  What is the 
worst case scenario?  That someone else’s hard-earned cash is lost, that
the trader is fired—only to take up work across the street in due course. 
It is not the trader’s money that is actually at risk; it is not the trader’s 
life savings that might be lost.  The trader’s money is safe and sound, 
and the knowledge that this is true—that the stakes are not nearly so high
for these importantly positioned financial actors as they are for those whose
money is truly at risk—leads to such disastrously ill-informed risk-
taking behavior.251 
With this in mind, policy proposals seeking to promote financial
regulatory reform in the context of difficult-to-price securities should 
therefore be more properly directed towards promoting a broader, far-
reaching understanding of these securities as they are bought and sold in the
secondary market—as well as in the primary market for that matter—than
towards prohibiting certain misconceived conflicts of interest and sales 
practices that are not so much contrary to the best interests of investors
as they are often necessary for such market-making to occur in the first
instance.  In other words, we should not ask, How do we get certain
financial players to act solely in the best interests of their clients?, but
rather we should ask, How do we get these very same players, who buy
and sell difficult-to-price financial products from and to the investing 
public, to sit down and actually spend the long, often painful hours
251. And this has been generally true for well over a hundred years now. See generally
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914). 
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necessary to understand and appreciate exactly what it is that they are 
making a market? 
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the claim is that what tends to cause problems where transacting 
in difficult-to-price securities is not so much excessive risk-taking per se
but rather a fundamental cluelessness as to whether or not these risks are 
excessive in the first place.  By entrusting money to the hands of purely 
disinterested financial advisers who are, in turn, subject to certain 
behavioral effects giving rise to uninformed risk-taking behaviors, the 
claim is that such regulated funds will be made ever more the hapless,
unsuspecting targets of sophisticated, fully motivated financial actors
lurking ominously in the shadowy background of a largely unregulated
de facto banking system.  No, the correct approach is to establish and
promulgate rules and regulations that effectively replicate the incentives 
confronted by those who trade at firms with typical hedge fund-like 
governance structures.  The more aligned the incentives are as a
consequence, the lower the agency costs, and thus the better the quality
of decisionmaking.  Instead of passing legislation specifically designed 
to eliminate or reduce the salutary impact of proprietary transactions
upon incentives, this Article argues for just the opposite—that legislation
be passed to make the incentives facing broker-dealers and investment
advisers and investment banks look more like those of the typical hedge
fund, not less. 
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